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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA
AND THE POLISH-SAXON QUESTION

-2-

The Congress of Vienna met according to the arrangements made at the first Peace of Paris.

When the Congress met,

the first serious problems which it had to face were Poland and
Saxony.

The reasons for the grave importance of these were

rather simply that they represented primary interests of two
of the Great Powers

(Russia and Prussia),

and they threatened

the security of France and Austria and evon England indirectly.
The Russian claim on Poland dated back a number of years
to when the Emperor of Russia,

Alexander I,

was in his youth

and being educated by the liberals La Harpe and Czartoryski.
There is little doubt that Alexander took seriously the pro
testations of these two men about the grave evil of th� partitions of Poland and the grandness that would be associated
with the reconstruction of the ancient Kingdom.

As .Napoleon

was being defeated and Alexander was fast becoming the savior
of Europe,

he did not forget the lessons of his old masters,

and when he passed through Poland he promised the Poles that
he would see that an independent Kingdom of Poland was erected.

1

1

The background to AJ.exa.nder I is taken chiefly from
Madam La Comtesse de Choiseul-Gouffier, Historical Memoirs of
Alexander I and the C.ourt of Russia. (Chicago: A. c.. McClurg
and Co., 190'0};" C.Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I
Vol. III (London: Tinsley Brothers, IS'75); and-:Adam OzartorYski
Memoirs of Prince Czarto
ski and his Correspondence with
llexa.nderI, ed. Aaam Gi gud, VO!.il (London: Reiill:gton and Co.,

1888).

H

- 3Alexander's Kingdom of Poland was not to be all of
Poland but a portion of it known as the Duchy of Warsaw which
had been earlier established by Napoleon and given to the King
of Saxony.

The desires of Alexander to create a kingdom of

Poland were, of course, known to the other �'uropean powers
and most of them had some reason to fear his desires.

A

Russian Poland would leave the old frontiers of both Prussia
ru1d Austria in Russian hands.2 France and England both feared
this situation because they did not wish to see Russia made
3
too powerful for her neighbors.
The Saxon port�on of the question was the result of
the Russian demands.

If Russia was to be aggrandized in

Poland, this would take some of the territories belonging to
Frussia and Austria.

Austrian demands couid be adequately

it not satisfactorily quenched in Italy.4 Prusnia had only
2castlereagh to the Emperor of Russia. Vienna, October
12, 1814, Arthur Duke of Wellington. Supplementary Dispatches,
Correspondence and Memoranda of li'ield Marshal Arthur Duke of
Welli ton (London: John Murray, i862) Vol. IX, pp. 330-331:"
Hereaff
ter referred to as Wellington S.D.
3Ta1leyrand to Louis XVI!I. Vi�nna, September 25, 1814.
The Correspondence of Prince Talle rand and Louis XVIII Duri
the Co ress of Vieiliia (New York: �harles Scribner's Sons, 1�1)
PP:- 1Hereafter referred to as Talleyrand Correspondenc e ;
and Liverpool to Castlereagh, Fife House, September 25, 1814.
Wellington, £.Q., Vol. IX, PP• 285-286.
4castlereagh to Liver:0ool, Vienna, October 4, 1814. c. K.
Webster, "Englcnd and The Polish-Saxon Problem at The CongresD
of Vienna," Transactions .2f. The Royal Historical Societ
Third
t
Saries, Vol. VII (London: Royal Historical Society, 191 ; ,
AppendixP. 73. Hereafter referred to as Webster, "The PolL:.:h
Suxon Question.

�
•

�
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Saxony to which she could look for sufficient aggrandizement
for her pro j ected losses in Poland.

The King of Saxony had

in the eyes of many of the European powers,
Russ ia , England,

including

Prussia,

and to certain extent Austria, lost his rights

because of his loyalty to Napoleon.5
The representatives of France and England are the two
repre s entatives w hose policies are the best to examine
relation to the Polish-Saxon question.

their

own

admission

England and France by

were the two powers least involved,

in the terri tpria l disputes,

in
directly,

and they were both in positions to

act as mediators.6

Englund, represent ed by Lord Castlereagh, held the
advantageous position of semi-isolation.

Ca stle reagh was aware

that the insular position of England allowed her to observe
continental affairs and to step in at the proper time on the

most expedient side to fore<

a

conclus ion . 7 C astler e agh ' s

interpretatioi1 of continental affairs was that which he had
5castlereagh to Wellincton, Vienna, October 20, 1814,
S.D. Vol. IX, pp. 357-359.
Wellington, -6
'i/ellington to Castlereagh, Iilons, Augu�t 18, 1814.
Viocoun.t Castlerea.ght Correspondence Dispatches, nnd Other
Papers of Viscount Cast!ereagh, e<I. c. W. Vane, VOI:" X, pp. 93-94.
Hereafter referred to as Castlereagh Corres pondence; Wellington
t0 Castlereagh, Paris, October 9, 1814.
Castlereagh Corre$pond
ence Vol. X, pp. 160-161; and Castlereagh to the Emperor of' Russia ,
Vienna, October 12, 1814. Wellingt on, �·�· Vol. IX, p. 329.
7
castlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, December 5t 1814.
Wel l ington , S.D.
V ol. IX, PP• 462-465.
-
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inherited from Pitt and others.
was to establish

a

8

The

prime

objective o:f England

bala..�oe of power which would enable the

continent to live in

peace

tent interests which

were

and England to pursue
cO!lli"Uercial.

The

her

most in

position of Castle-

reagh at the Congress was to some extent hampered by the lack
of understanding and interest in continental a.ff airs which
existed in England.

Castlereagh realized that he would have

to defend his dealings at

Vienna

Parliament when he returned.

9

to a not too sympathetic

The problem of defense to the

Parliament wa$ accentuated by the weak position of the Liverpool Cabinet which at its outset was expected to be very short
lived 10
.

English policy at the Congress is not difficult to
recognize, but the value of the British position is not that
it sought a power balance alone but that 1t allowed Castlereagh the flexibility to chal'lga his position as the necessity
arose.

In exLmining the diplomacy of

Castlereagh

at the

Congress of Vienna, one muf\t keep in mind that his
terest wa� to establish

Po'tver

a

great

in-

balance, and the importance of his

�dward V. Gulich, Eu.roRe's Classical Balance of
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp.205-206.

9Liverpool to Castlereagh, Ii'ife House, September 25,
1814, Wellington, S.D. Vol. IX, PP• 825-826; Liverpool to
Castlereagh, F·ife House, October 14, 1814, Wellington, S.D.
Vol. IX, pp. 342-344.
1011 ry
A. K iss i �e r , A World Restored (New York:
en
Grosset and Dunlop, 1964), p.-29.
-
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dealings vms the way in which he accompllsheu this end.
li'rance,
Engla.�d,

rGp:.esented by Prince Talleyrand,

was,

like

not directly involved in the territorial disputes

related to the Polish-Saxon question.11 France,

however,

entered the Congress only through the generosity of the otber
Powers at the Treaty of Paris. 12 Her position
beginning one of strenfrth.
Congress,

because she
had

was

no-t in the

Talleyrand could riot come to the

did Pru.ssia or Ru0si::i.,

as

vn:i.s

demandi:ng aggrandizement

a defeated power and her territorial questions

all been �ettled by the Treaty of Paris.13 She al s o could

not expect to

be

accept e d as readily as England since she was

not an ally of the other Great Powers.
Talleyrand,

as representative of France,

could not have

entered the discussions at the· Congress with a general and
open policy as did Castlereagh,

br..�=>e

his stru1d on principle.

and so he 1tdsely chose to

Perhaps,

the greate s t fear

generated by :.?ranee was the fear springing from he1" revolution'a:r'J spirit so recently eXL"llbi ted in the Frerich H.evolution.
Talleyrand did much to keep this fear in check by supporting
o.

cons ervative principle.

0lccitimacy,"

was

His pr incip l e ,

which he called

based upon the idea that sovereigns gain

11Tulleyrand to Louis .AlfIII, Vienna, Nove mber 17,
Prince Talleyrand, Me moirs of the Prince De Talleyrand,
ed. The Due De Broglie, Vol. II, pp. 320-330. Hereafter re
ferred to an Talleyrand, Memoirs.

1814.

12see Appendix II.

13see Appendix II.

7

-

-

their pow er from their inheritance and from just ce ssions

4By

made to them and not by conquest.1

servative policy,

Talleyrand was actually following the mont

expedient line for France.
Reconstruction

.2f

following such a con-

When Guglielmo Fe 1 re ro in "The

Europe 11 claims that 'ra.J.leyrand came to

tl;.e Congress in opposi ticn to the principles of e ·xpediency,

l
5

he is only partly correct since Talleyrand was following what
was expedient for France.
The Congress of Vienna offered Talleyrand the opportunity to have l"rance accepted as a major force in Europeru1
diplom�cy,

and this was his primary objective throughout.

Upon his c.rrival,

Austricc.,

and

Na.poleo�,

he found the Four Powers

Er...gland ) ,

(Prussia,

Russia,

who had formed an alliance to defeat

ntill allied to settle the affairs of Europe.

Hio

first ob j ect ive was to deotroy if pos sible the old coalition
V> •. 1ich

had de feate d Napoleon and bring France into European

6
affairs as an equal. 1 Secondly,

he intended to oppo s e the

dcmancs of both Pru.Bsia and Rusoia.

He v1as e..;pecially con-

4
1 Talleyrand to Louis A"VIII, Vienna, December 7, 1814,
Talleyrand, �.lemoirs Vol. I I , p. 355.
l
5GuglieL"ilo Fcr:re ro, The Reconstruction of Europe Tr>.lleyr and and The Cons1ess ofVienna tr. T. ti. Jueckel , (Nevi
York: w. W. Norton and Compruzy, 1963).

1

6Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, Viem1a, October 4, 1814,
Talleyrand, Correa ondence pp. 12-24. 'l:alleyra.nd doeo not say
specifically that is prime object is to destroy the allianc e ,

�

but the veno� with which he trects the alliance i� sufficient
:;.nclication o= hie s0ntiments.
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cerned about Pn1ssia since he considered a too powerful
Prussia as a threat to the future of France and Europe alike. 1 7
Russian desires for Poland were to be opposed because they
strengthened Prussian demands on Saxony and also because Talleyrand saw Rusaia as a threat if she were to become a tru.ly
.J.i..'uropean power.
As the opening of the Congress drew near, Talleyrand
and Castlereagh came to Vienna as potential mediators.
advantage was clearly in the hands of Castlere agh .

had to first

�ivide

The

Talleyrand

the allies or hope for circUI!lstances to

divide them and then become accepted by the powers as rightfully to be consulted in the a.ff airs of Europe .
The Polish-Saxon question was the first serious
business to come before the CQngress.
the Cori-1.r,ress t there

was

ari.

At the beginning of

apparent domination of the Polish

Saxon discussions by Castlereagh.18This apparent domination
can, however, be misleadin g . Castlereagh, it will be seen led
the opposition to the Tsar's Polish schemes alld also led Austria
in support of Prussia's claims on Saxony.

It is impor·tant to

watch the activities of 'ralleyra.nd which were directed at under
mining·.

the efforts of Castlereagh to gain an agreement among

the Four Powers on the Polish-Saxon question.

l7
Ta1leyrand to Louis XVIII , October 31, 1 814, Talleyrand,
Memoirs Vol. I I pp. 2 9-294.
8
1 8This is the interpretation of c. K. Webster.
Webster,
0The Polish-Saxon Question," App·endix pp. 58-59.
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As will be seen,

Oastlereag� failed in his plan to

create a powerful Prussia by giving her Saxony and to prevent
the ex ces sive development of Russia by thwarting her Polish
This could blandly be attributed to the efforts of

scheme�.

Talleyrand",

but thi s iB also not quite the ca s e .

did hope to see the dinsolution of thn alliance,

ac

an alliance against Fra..'Yl.ce,

Tal leyrand
which he saw

but he did no t so much effect

the dissolution as he took advantage of the breakdown and did
all in his power to encourage it.

During the early period,

there

are

three important

developments which should be noted: firstly, how and why
Castlereagh's plan failed; secondly, the rise of Talle yrand
in the estimation of Austria and England; and thirdly, the
gradual b reak down of th e alliance and why it was happening.
These must, of course,

be observed both separately and con

currently.
In underotanding the work of the Congress, it· is
important to know hov1 it Vias

wes never convened.

organized.

The Congress

as

such

Most of the work of the Congress was done

by contacts ut social functions or at private homes.
settlements were made by two committees.

The

The Committee of

the Fou r Great Powe rs, to which France was later admitted as
the Fifth Great Power,

made

mos t

of the important decisions.

The Committee of Eight was made up of the Four Great :Powers
pluz the four others who signed th e Treaty of Paris.

This

committe e wao to approve the actions of the Commi ttee o f t he

-1 0-

F'our and settle other issues not directly related to the
interests of the Four Great Powers.
committees,

In addition to the major

ten others were appointed.

For thin paper, the

German Committee is of primary importance.

It was composed of

five German powers and was to decide affairs relative to the
German Confederation.

Later in Dece�ber 1814, a Statistical

or Population Committee,

composed of representatives of the

Four Great Powers and of France,

was called to settle popu

lation questions involved in the Polish-Saxon dispute

(this

1
committee will be discussed later). 9 Even these committees

d.id not assume a truly.formal assembly during most of the
early period of the Congress.
In the beginning, Talleyrand projected that he would,
in combination with the smaller powers, be able to be a true
force in the decision making in an open Congress.

However,

if the Congress did not meet in open session, Talleyrand's
effectiveness would be considerably reduced.

For this reason,

at first, Talleyrand was quite insistent upon a convening of
the whole Congress.2 0

The Great Powers

(Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia)

held their first semi-formal meeting on September 30, 1814.
l

9c. K. Webster, � Congress of Vienna 1814-1815
(London Oxford University Press, nd), pp. 73-77 ; and Harold
ress of Vienna - A st
ty
Nicholson, The Co
in Allied
•
1812-1832 (New Yo� : ¥he-Viking Press, 1
2)-;-pp. 141-

�

9�

20Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, Vienna,
Talleyrand Correspondence, pp. 28-42.

¥4�

October 9,

1814,

-11-

This first meeting was for the object of setting up a r:iethod
for conducting business.

Talleyrand was invited to 11assist"

at this meeting where the preliminaries were to be discussed.
Tlrr
monsiP.ur a.e
•

.ua
.)pm11sh
T b rador, thLe c:<
0

�

0

0

nu n::i..s ter,

wao

21

also 1nv1ted•
0

0

The meeting was opened by Metternich, and Lord Castlereagh
suggested to Talleyrand that he take note of the protocol which
they ho,d all signed earlier and which did not place F'ra.""lce in
a position of power
England ) .

( all' being

Russia, Prussia, Austria and

Talleyrand took note of the protocol and immediately

began hio firn"t assault which wao to last until the final
brealtdown of the old uilia.nce.

The protocol included the

numerous inclusions of the word "allies," and Talleyrand
imi"!lediately aslced

why

the word appeared.

He reported that

he hn.d been told by the "allies" that they had used the word only
for the sake of brevity, and he replied that brevity wes no
excuse for inaccuracy.

After Talleyrand had made a few more

objections to the whole document, the protocol was withdrawn.

22

A second document was then introduced into the meetine;,
and this document was a proposal on the procedural arrangement
of the Congress.

The declaration proposed the establishment

of two committees to prepare all of the work for the Congress,
and then submit their efforts to the Open Congress for its

2

1.r

alleyrand to Louis XVIII, Vienna, October 4,
Talleyrand Correspondence, pp. 12-13.
22
Ibid., PP• 15-16.

1814,
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a:pproval.

and

Talleyrand requested time to examine the document

make his decision.23
In his letter to Louis XVIII,

Talleyrand

mentioned

that the plan of the "allies" was to control all of tho
of the

Congress

to approve.

buciness

as they pleased and only permit the other powers

The French m:inister

observed

that even if'

he nnd

the :Jpanish m:ininter were admitted to this c,ommi ttee of' the
Greo.t Power-.J they would be outvoted four to two and woulD.. be of
little value.24
Later,

Talleyrand was to accept admission to the

Coracnittee without the $panioh Irlinister to assist him.
did this change truce place?
partially answers

several

"Nhy

The ru.1�wer to this question

questions.

Talleyrand was going

to accept admission as a Fifth Power after the Four Powers
had broken their alliance and
celves.

become

divided against them-

If the Powers were divided two against two,

a

French

vote would break the tie.

This observation gives insight into

Tc.lleyrand's policy since,

as one will observe,

Talleyrand

wn.s to insist upon the protection of the small powers until
the position of France was guaranteed,
no more about convening the Congress

Sfilall

us

and then one would hear
a whole or giving the

powers more representation.

23Ibid.,

pp.

18-21.

24Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, Vienna, October 9,
Talleyra.Yld Corresponden ce, pp. 28-29 and 41-42.

1814,
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Another conference took place a few days later,

at

which the proposed asBembly of the Congress w�s discussed
and at which time

Talleyrand pressed for a.n early asse;ubly.25

Duringtthe in·�erval between these coni'erences,
had subinitted a new proposal for the

committees.

Talleyrand stated that

establiGhment of the

CPstleroagh's proposal

waD materially no differedil from the first,

his disapproval to Castlereagh.2

6

While at the conference,
of Metternich,

Castlereagh

and he wrote

which again met at the home

a very important revelation took place when

Metternich in anger comJn.ented that the Four had planned

to

settle the Polish-Saxon issue and all the others in their
ovvn way. 27 This was of course lmovm by Talleyrand and the
others at the

Congress, but the adr.a.ission of it by Metternich

gave it a more solid state than speculation.
A third meeting took place two weeks later,

the whole

object of which was to put off the date for opening the
Congress until !fovember l,

1814.

Talleyrand insisted upon

a few additions to this proposal and then approved it.28 The
important point of this series of

25Ibid.,
26Ibid.,

27Ibid.,
28Ibid.,

pp. 3 -33.
2

pp. 30-31.

p.3 .
2
PP• 39-42.

mee tings was

that in them

-14-

the 11allies11 attempted to establish, viith the app roval of
Frn.nce and Spain

(in the last two conferences Portugal

attended at her own inGintence),

C ongr esn as

a

their domination of the

whole 1Nhen it finally would meet.

The plan of the

ll ie e,

"a

11

hov·.·ever,

failed and the

p mvers rather interestingly after this last meeting which

took place on about October 8,
and the Congr es s went i nt o

c..

1814, did not mee t agnin,

lo ng period of completely

private and non-foroal coni'erences.

This period of social

diplomacy las �ed until the middle of December when issues
on the

Polish-Saxo n

questjon finally came to a head.29

The reason for thio period was the i nsis tence of the. "allien"
on nonil'!.terference by France or the o ther p·owe:cs,

and they

now felt this could be b e st accomplished i f they did not

hold form.al meetings at which these other P ewers could be
present.

l:Iention was mad e earlier that th e Committee o:f Pour
made nll of the important decisions until France was a dmi tt e d
in January,

but thin committee never received the approval of

France nor did it make any lasting decisions until after France

29Talleyra.�d to Louis XVIII, Vienna, December 28,
Talleyrand Memoirs', Vol. II p p . 377-381; Castlereagh
to Liverpool, Vienna, January 1, 1814, Webster "The Polish
Saxon Question" Appendix pp. 89-90; and Cook to Liverpool,
Vienna., Deceraber 24, 1814, Wellington .§_.D. Vol. IX, pp. 502-

1814,
503.

-

15

-

had become an important influence.30

30The issue of Poland was tacitly decided before
the admission of France to the CoriUJ.i ttec of the Great
Powers t but it was done with the 8t,7l'eement of France as
will be seen.

CHAPTER II
THE DOftiINATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS
{.!ONCERNING POIJiliD AND SAXONY BY
LORD CASTLEREAGH .AND HIS FAILURE
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If the Congre3s was to be successfully concluded
the Polish-Saxon question was the one question which had
to be settled since most of the other decisions of the
Congreso were contingent upon it.31
Even before the Congress began,

the Powere all

realized what demands would be ma.de by Russia in P0land
and Prussia in Sa.-x:ony.
made only with France,

At the Treaty of Paris,
there

was

a notable omission of any

mention of the Polish-Saxon question,3
of

a

which was

2

This is also true

settlement of the Polish or Saxon claims in any other

prior treaties between the 0allies11

(although the problem

had been mentioned in the Treaties of Kalish and Reichenbach).

Great Britain's Prime Minister,

Lord Liverpool,

was to express his regrets that the 0allies" had not
settled the question of Poland between ther.iselves ·before
they ever got to the Congress.33

l
3 The German Confederation could not be arranged until
the size and number of the German Powers ·was lrwiovm nJ1d thiz
could not be known until the fate of Saxony had been decided.
The fate of Saxony could not be decided until the fate of
Poland had been determined since the amount of aggrandizement
for Prussj_a in Saxony depended upon the amount of Prussian
Poland which Russia received.

1814,

�

3 see Appendix II.
3..;Liverpool to Castlereagh, Fife House,
Wellington, S.D., Vol. IX, pp. 285-286.

September 25,

-18-

When discussionn of the twin disputes over 1\ussiDn
and Prussian demo.nd� began at the OongresB,

the

�ttitu de

of

Russia wa� clearly drawn by the Emperor since throuch hin
every action and word he tol� the powers that he was in
Poland to stay,

and he would not be removea.34 The Eoperor

had in his cupport the backing of the Poles and of the great
Polish patriot Czartoryski,

who later vras less than pleased

with the outcome.35 Throughout the discussions it

wns

nentioned in the correspondence of both TalleyrWld and
Castlereagh t�at they believed the Emperor to regret his
Polish committal and that he would lil<:e to find a wey out.36
Alexander had stated his claims on Poland so strongly and so
often 2.11d had made so mar� promises that he believed that he
could not withdraw from his claims and retain

a

poc ition of

strengt� during the remainder of the discussions.37

34The Emperor's determination can be oeen in hie
to the letters and memora.nd<.! of Lord Castlereagh and
replie:J
in hin conversationo with Castlereagh, Talleyrand and otherc
Some of these will be discussed later
present at the C ongres s .
in the paper.
35c�a.rtoryski, PP•

282-288,

PP • 302-375.

36Liver:pool to Cook, Fife House, December 9 , 1814,
Wellington, S.D., Vol. IX, pp. 467-468; and Talleyrand to
Louie nrIII,-VIenno,, Novembe r 1 7, 1814, Talleyrand Iilemoirs,
Vol. II pp. 320-330.

37Alexo.nC.er had made promises to the Poles and to the
Prucsians, ::md it would have been extremely embarraosing for him
to back dovm at this point.
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The Prussio..YJ. po[':ition on Pol c.nd a...'1.d Saxony
clearly dr2.vm,

less

,;me

and it in for this reacon that the British

policy appears rather naive in historiccl �1erspective.

Frw::3ia.

come to the Congren3 prof essi:ng a demand for Saxony and
clista�te for the Tsar'o Polish pretensions.
this

as

a

Castlereach took

the direction in which Prussian policy could be precsed

fill.d conducted himself accordingly.38
Auntria,
wao

when th e debates on Poland 2.!1d Saxony beGa:n,

in the worst of c1.- ll posoible positions.

:3he was threatened

with destruction of her frontier defenses o:i two borders,

and

she wns uncble to pre vent the deotructio:'l of either of them
T�1e only power upon which she could depend,

una.iued.
wac

at all,

.;.:)ri
TI
•t ain. 39

G·reat

•

Great Britain,

as

repres e nte d by Lord Cactlerecr.gh,

as Castlere�eh him3elf indicated,

had,

no direct interest in either

the problerac of Poland or Saxony but was able to act

ae

mediutor. 4° Castler e agh accerJted the prote:::taticns o:f tt.e
mini;;ter (HarC:enberc;)
hone:::t.

in o pr) o oition to

, , ..
,,
(. ..�.

Hie policy followed such <Jn assumption during the

3 Ca8tle reach to Liverpool, Vj_enna, October 9, 1814,
�'!ebstcr "Tb.e Polish-Saxon C�uention" Appendix pp. 74-75.

8

39Prince Metternich., ilemoirs of Princ e
ed. Prince Richard Uetternich tr. Mr:.::;. Alexander
Ne.pier (Nev: York: Charl e s Scribner's Sona, 1880) Vol. II, pp.

177�-1815.
569-570.

40castlereagh to the En1peror of Runoia,
S._;Q. Vol. IX:, p. 329.

12, 1814, \"lelline;ton

:.letternich
Vienna,

October
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early months of the Congreos.
all thing::; to esta.blich

a

41

Castlereagh wished above

balance of pmver on the Continent.

He saw the moe>t favorable bale.nee as beine an alliance of

Austria, Pruosia and the other German States thus providing
a great central barrier between Hussia in the East and F-rance

in the West.
en

42

Castlereagh,

as an inheritance from Pitt, held

almost unreasonable fear of the Giant of the East,

per

43
and an almost equally great fear of
conified by Alexander r
France because of the r-Bsults of the French Revolution and
the Napoleoni9 Wars.

44

For the above stated reasons, Castle

reagh began his negotiations with the stated intention of
thwarting the demands of Hussia and al lying Prussia and
Austria.
ber

a

If Prussia needed Saxony (even all of it),

to make

powerful barrier to France in the North of Germany and to

gain her cooperation with Austria,

that was perfectly accept

45

able to Castlereagh.

Talleyrand,

representing French policy, did not agree

41
castlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, October 9, 1814,
v;ebster •rThe Polish-Saxon Question" Appendix PP• 73-75; and
Castlereagh to JJiverpool,Vienna, October 14, 18 14, Webster "The
Polish-Saxon Question" Appendix pp. 75-76.
42cantlereagh to V!ellington, Vierma, October 25,
Castleree..gh Correspondence Vol. X, pp. 173-175.

43

1814,

Gulich, pp. 211-212.
44
Thi:::; could also have been c..rl. inr,.eri tn.nce from Pitt but
wa:::: actually a fear held
by all of the Powers. at the Congress.
45
castlereagh to lia.rdenberg, Vienna, October 12, 1814,
Y.'ellinc;ton,3.D. Vol. IX, pp. 339-340.
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with Castlereagh ' s ansessment of the balance of :European
power.

Talleyrend , through his policy, showed his belief

that the ren.l threat to future peace in
e..nd

Prussiun

at the

Europe

was Prussia

The French Plenipotantiary ' s hopes

�ilitn.riom.

Congresn centered around the abolition of the old

ctlliance and the destruction of Prussian pretensions in
Saxony .

The

Emperor Alexander ' s Polish schemes presented

to Talleyrand the indications of a potential threat to
Au�tria, it is true , but the pri�e importance of Russia in
Polc:.nd was that it meant the necensity of aggrandizing
46
Prussia in Saxony, and . to thia France was opposed.
As the conference began, Castlereagh tended. to
dominate the dealings for several reasons .
mo.de her claims , and it

was

for her now to defend her claims

against those who would wish
was not in

a

Russia had already

position to lead

to taJce
a

them from her.

Austria

diplomatic attaclc either

against Prussia or Ruszia because she could ill afford to
malce her position even worse between the two powerc demanding

her frontiers.
c::.n

e.11

47

Franc e , up to this time , had not been

equal by the Great Powers and �till had to

her accGptanc e .

If

France

had tried t o take the

press
lead

accepted

for

at

the bec;inning of the Congress , Castlereagh ' s threat , that

46

Thia ic tacitly ad.laitted by Talleyrand Geveral time::;
in hie correcponden� e , but ic mo�t clearly stated in his letter.
Talleyrn.nd to Louis XVI I I , Vienna, N ovember 17, 1 814 , Talleyra.."1.d
Memoirs Vol. I I , pp� 322-32 5 .
47
Metternich, Vol . II, PP • 36 9-370 .
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JJ.l of the powers would turn a.guinst her,
have been correct . ·'i-B Prussia
Saxon claim� .

was

Whether or not

uecided to support Russ i � ' s

would probably

se eking support for her

the King of Prussia. had already

demands, Pru3sia

was not willing

to risk her claim� by advo cating a strong policy except
her

own

de fensc . 4 9 The lead in the early affairs wao thus

left t o Castlereagh who assessed himself,
him,

as

in

the one best suited t o

mediate

as othera assessed

r::1 o
the problems at hand . ::

Castlereagh ' s dominat ion actually began some time
before the opening of the Congre ss when he first Btarted
to ma]{e knovvn his strong opposition to
pretenoions .

the

Tsar ' s Poli3h

The opp o n i t ion of Castlereagh t o the Tsar ' s

scheme was clearly drawn by September 2 5 , 1814,

when Lord

Liverpool wrote t o Castlereagh of the �"'mperor ' s scheme ,
11We shsll have a hard fight against public opinion in defense
of 8Xly arrangements of which the independence of Poland doea
not now form a part . "

The Prime Miniater goes on t o say in

another part of his letter that

it is regret t able that England

was responcible for starting the idea o f Polish independence

48

castlereagh t o Liverp o o l , Vienna,
v.·ellington S . D . , Vol. IX pp. 323-3 2 5 .

October 9 ,

1814,

�

4 9c stlereagh to JJive rp ool, Vien11::.�,

October 9 , 1814 ,
"The Poli sh-Saxon Que::: tion II Append.ix, pp . 7 4-75 . Thi a
i:J a different letter than the one noted for footnote numbe r
48.
Cc.r.:tlereagh often v1rote more tl:an one letter in a day t o
Liverp o o l .

v:e br;ter

50
wellineton t o Cuntle:i:-ec.ch, Pari::.; , October 9 , 1814.
Castlercrl.€h C o rrec12ondence , Vol. :?... , pp. 160-161; ru1C\. CaGtlereu,:_;L
to the :8'.nperor of Hussia, V ici'LYlH,
Oc tober 12 , 1Bl4 , Wellilli.�ton

� D ' V01 • .L.11.
- - -. ,
:P• 3".>C:
C:.. ":J •
.:;.·�·
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and now was to defend the partition of i t . 51 Thi;;; indicates ,
rather well, the stand t a.ken by

actual

Castlereagh

even be:fore

.the

Congre ss vms due to get under way.
Castle reagh ' s program

for

re-establ ishing the peace of

Europe and the balance of power in Europe ,
outline d ,

consisted of creating a

strong

already partially

and se cure Prussia

and st opping Alexander ' s attempts at westward expansion.
Castlereagh ' s diplomat i c progres s during the first
portion o:f the Congre ss c an best bE: understood . .by examining
the three major phases of his diplomacy : his dealings with
Alexander dire.ctly;

his dealings with

the attempts he made to unite them;

Austria

and

his

and Prussia and

dealings with the

French both through Talleyrand at Vienna and through Welling�on
in contact with Blacas

Ca3tlereagh ' s

and Jaucourt at Pari s .
d e alings with the

Emperor

the for-.n of several interviews and memoranda.
p0rnonal contact8 and memoranda were couched
cil iatory terms ,

and yet they displayed

a

o f Rus3ia

took

All of these

in very

con-

ve�J forceful and

determined policy on the part of the British m inister.
The first contact which the British p lenipotentiary
had with Alexander I was a private

interview only

the arr:i..Y.al of the Emperor at the Congre s s .
interview,

1814,

a

day after

During the

Castlereagh proposed to the E!.aperor

l
5 Liverpool to Co.stlere2.{Sh� Fife Houc e ,
Wellington, S . D . Vol IX , JiP • 285-286 .

that Britain

Sept ember 2 5 ,
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would :not be indisposed to allowine the rest oration of Poland
on the bao is of that country ' s limit in 1792 · uncler an independ
ent ;nonarch. 52 T o the proponal of allowir..g the re�t oration o f
the Poland of 1792 under an independent iiono.rch,
added,

Castlereagh

"that they took a broad distinction between the erection

of a part of Poland into

a

Kingdom merged in the Crown of HuEi sia,

and the restoration of the whole of

a

greater part into

a

distinct and independent S t ate . " 5 3 The opinion of the Prince
Regent on thin iszue,

according to Cantlereagh, was that ,

although Britain would favor the independence of Poland,
did not feel that such . a sacrifice could be
powers involved .

he

justly asked of the

Itu.ssi a ' s Emperor admitted that he was not

willing to make ouch a sacrifice of the part of the Emp ire.
Alexander,

although afun itt ing thut he was unwilling t o mnke

the sacrifice necessary for the creation of an independent
Poland,

still insisted upon nis own demands for the Duchy of

Waroaw under hin rule aa the minimum that could be given to
tho Poles.

Castlereagh count ered this demand by

arguing

thin would be asking t o o much of Austria and Prus sia.

that

The

plenipotentiary pointed out that although the King of Prussia,
through p ersonul loyal ty to Alexander I ,

might not oppose his

Polish scheme� they were still repUt,
�ant to him and also to

52castlereaeh to Liverpool, Vienna, October 2, 181 4 ,
\'/ebnter nThe Polich-Saxon Question" Appendix, pp. 71-7 .
2
r') 3 Ibid . , P• 7 0.
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the rest of Zu.rope .

54

The next dey , Castlereagh, neeking to

:�'llc e hin position even more clear, approached Count Ncsselrode
and pressed. upon him the danger and error in demanding the
destruction of the Polish front::.. ers of Auf; tria and Prussia
which Russian demanclo for Poland would necessitate.

:J ::.>

r i:::

It is

clear from the firot contact which Castlereagh had with the
Emperor that his policy was to be one of reason and straightforwardnes s .
The method of Castlereagh next turned from inform.al
conversation "{Vith the Emperor to the raore formal realm of
the personal letter.
Emperor on October 1 2 ,

The letter sent by Castlereagh to the
1814 was not a formal memorandlli�.

this letter, the British minister opposed directly
tensions of Hussia in Poland .

In

the pre-

He d iplomat i c ally avoided

being offensive by couching his objections in the most
conciliatory of terms when ref erring to his respect for the
.Zmperor.

56
Making the most use of his position as a disinterested

party in the Polish negotiations, Castlereagh pointed out in
the very beginning of his letter that ,

"Britain i3 the last

51
�Ibid . , p . 10 .
55
castlereagb. to Liverpool, Vienna, October 2 , 1814 ,
ThiG io
Webster, "The Polish-Saxon Quention" Appendix, p . 73 .
not the rn.une letter as footnoted 52-54 .
56
October
cnotlerea,eh to the Emperor of Ru�sia, Vien.�u,
12, 1814, Wellington, .2_.Q. , Vol . I.A, pp . 32 9 , 3 3 1 .
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power whose separate interests could be endangered by any
determination of Your llajesty on the side of Poland •
Ca$tlereagh then observed that British policy,

• • n

although opposed

to Russia being aggrandized with all of the Duchy of Warsaw,
"will not therefore •

• •

[ b e ] indisposed to witness ,

even with

satisfaction, Your Imperia� rna j esty rece iving a liberal and
important aggrandizement on your Polish Front i er . " 5 7
Ca�tlereagh then went o n t o a series o f arguments t o
prove

that the :E:nperor would drop at leant a pa.rt o f his

claims in Poland .

Firet,

he pointed out that Alexander could

"receive an ample pladge of "European gratitude without imposing
upon your [his] allies und neighb o rs an arrangement inconsistent with the relation::-3 of independent ntateo to each
other . ''

Sec ondly ,

generous

o ettlement s

Persia

Castlereagh reminded the J!;mperor of the
which he had received in Finland ,

(these were to protect Russian frontiers ) .

and

He also

reminded Alexander of the f avornble treaty whioh Russia
received from the Ottoman Porte be cause of the interc ession
of Great Britain.

Thirdly ,

he pointed out that the other

F.uropen.n powers did not vlish to see the humiliation of the
Poles but thi n could not be at the expense of the dignity of
the other European powers .

Lastly,

he argued that ,

if the

Congresn of Vienna was going t o reach a happy and peaceful
conclusion instead of b e ing,

57Ibid.

"a o c ene of discordant intrigue ,

27

-

and

a.

-

lawle n s ::> c ra.mble for power •

the way vvi th

a

• •

, 11

Al exn.nder must lead

policy of moderation of his demand ::; .

Castle-

reagh sugge s ted that the Congress coul d be a benefi c i al one,

ana. that Alexander could still :-etain most of the Ducr..y so
long as his neighbors

( Austria and Prussia)

retained su.fficient

front iers on their Polish borde rs for protection . 5 8 The total
policy of Castlereagh both in the preceedinc; letter and during
the early portion of the Congress was one of modification of
in ord er to mold Europe into

demands ,

an

acceptable balance

of power.
Alexander answered tl1e first le t te r of Cas tle re agh in
terms

of the right o of a conqueror t o dispose

of the territorieG

which he had conquered . 5 9 In re ply t o this letter,
reagh sent

a

memora.i'1dum , not a personal letter,

this tirae using greater fi rmne s s .

to the Emperor

It'lost o f his arguments were

the same as those used in the previous letter,
added several other argument s .

Castle-

but to these he

The British mini ster indicated

directly that the application of the law of conqueGt to Poland
could only result in the renewal of tho :i."'evolution2.ry spirit
\Vhich .I!.."'u.rope had labored so long to ::::q uelch.
Poles to Alexander,

58-b
l. l.' d •

By rullying tl1e

they would be encouz·aged to generate

5 9tremorandum by Castle reach to Alexander.
This is not
a letter and has no dat e .
Wellingt on S.D. Vol . IX, pp. 3 32-33 6 .
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revolutions in the ?olich territorien still held by Austria
and Pru::rnia.

His great est argument e..gainst the plans of

.Ruzoia was suomarized in the accusation that
of the Duchy of 'No.rGrnv

vmc

in oppoBi tion to the treat i e s which

Alexander hud mnd.e with Auntria and Prun si a .
ndded that Alexander ' s
exceed hin

the acqui cit ion

Castlereagh

o ral duty" to the Polee could never

"m

"moral duty" to uphold the tre uti e a h� had made . 60

Castlereagh ' s method of direct com..lllunication with
Alexander had up to this point produced no nignificant

ch2..1e
1g

in the Ernperor ' n determination t o obtain all of hin desire s .
The Emperor• s mind vms · not t o be changed by such exertions,
but Castlereagh continued t o try.

On October 30, 1814,
to Castlereagh ' s memorendu;:;i.
cround an attempt to

nulli fy

the Euperor of Ru3sia replied
The Emperor ' z areuments centered
the treatien which he :i.1ad made and

t o c onvince Castlereagh thc-�t nothing would force him t o change
his mind on the oub j e c t
to the R-nperor.

of Polnnd . 61 Castlereagh sent a reply

Hov1eve r ,

he had lost most of his hope of

convincing Alexander t o relinquish his pretensions .

Cestlereagh

60rbid. The treaties referred to in thio memora11dum

art;:) the Treatieo of Toplitz,

Hci chenbach,

Chaumont and K..alish;

o.11 of v1hich contain words to the approximat ion that th8 Duchy

of Wars&w will be dissolved in a way acceptable t o all of the
Castlereagh is aoking if it 8hould be accep table
:Powers involved.
to all of the Powern involved for Auctria and Pruss ia to lose the
protection of their front iers .

30,

61The Emperor of Russia to Cuotlerea,eh,
§_.£. Vol. IX, PP• 386-392

1814, V.'ellington

Vienna,

Oct 1)°'.Jer
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a.nmvered the Tsar in o rde r to !lave somethin8 concrete with
which to de fend him::Jelf in Parl iar.a.ent
recO:n..'ilende d ) . 6

2

Thi!:j le t t e r

sent to the King of

France

was

( which

Liverpool had

given t o rr alleyrand and also

becau'3e by this time Castlereagh

recognized that Franc G was going t o be involved directly in
future d i s cuc n ion3 ,

end he wanted her support.

Caotlere o.gh ' n memo rru.1dum of November 4 , 1814 was the
firmer;t

of hiD attacks

on the Empero r ' s Polish pretens ions.

In the J'.'.lemo randu..u. he refut ed the idea. that treaties are
abclinhed by r::u cces8 in the

field. 6 3

He went on t o attacl�

the c laim that Aus tria ::ind Prussia coul� be cuffi c i ently
aggra.�dized elz ewhcre for their lossen in Poland .
c ontent i on

was

Ca8tlereagh ' s

that the que s t i on was not i f Rus s i a and Austria

c ould be aggrand i z e d el:Jewhere ,

but if they had agree d t o

such aggranQize�ent in their treat i e s : T o this que stion
Castlereagh answere d in the negative on the bacis of the previ ous

agre e:nents made by the li'our Powers . Finally, Castlere0£h art-,-ued
that although Alexander might have been p e rfec tly sincere o.nd
never endanse red Pruocie. or Auotria by his Polish acqui:::>i tion3,
"it i c not upon pers onal confidence o r upon the life o f an

62Liverpool to CE�atl0reuch, Fife Eous e ,
1814 , Wellington S . D . V o l . IX, PP• 342-314.

October 1 4 ,

63castlereagh to the Emperor of h'uosia, Vienna,
November 4 , 181 5 , Wellington S . D. Vol. IV, p p . 410-416 .
Alexander had c laime 1 that the unpre ced ent ed success of
the allies in the war against Napoleon had annulled the
agre ements whi ch the allies had made pr�or t o this victory.
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indivi dual that the liberties and s e curity of states should
be based •

• •

"

64

The Emperor 8,f;ain saw fit to anm,·er Castlereagh ' s
menorandum of November 4 ,

1 814 but he refus e d absolutely to

budge from his fon'ler position.

65

CaE:tle rea,eh gfl.ve up hope

of changing the Empero r • 3 mind by thi� kind of memora.ndu.4
exchange .

Castle reagh answered the Emperor ' s memorandum

of November 2 1 ,
any effe c t .

1 814 but he held little hope of i t s havin:;

In his reply t o the Emperor,

Castle reagh dwelt

on the dangers inherent in the Polish scheme s .

He inferred

tha.t the Emp eror ' s Polish schemes could lec.d to

a

war.

The

British minister no longer appealed t o the E.�peror on the
basis of the injus t i c e

of his pret ensions .

66

This letter

marked the end of the c orrespondence between Alexander and
Castlereagh.

67

Castlereagh ' s direct met�od had failed,

but i t did

leave him with a record of long and firm oppocition to the
Russian schemes with which he could defend hi:nself to t!1e

64

castlereagh t o the Emperor of Rus s i � , Vi enna , November
1 814·r Wellington .§..Jl. Vol . IX, pp . 410-416 .
65
zmperor of Rus ;:; i �: to C u..::-: tlereo.gh, Vie:m
•
"1.a
.
,
Nove:nber 21 ,
1 81 4 , Wellington S . D . Vol. IX, PP • 4 4-1-44 6 .
66
castlereagh t o Liverpool , Vienna, tiovcmbcr 2 5 , 1814 ,
\'i-?.llington S . D . Vol . IX , :PP • 4 5 1-452.
67
caotlereagh had more confrontations with the E:.11peror,
but thera was no more an attem1:>t to convince the I:m:peror to
give up his Polish schemes but only the hope that they could
be ;
nodified enough to rrw.ke a nettlement p o s sible .
4,
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cabinet and to the other nations at the Congre s s .
December 5 ,

1 814 ,

By

Castlereagh considered the Polish issue

closed in favor of the Emperor,

and he only held out the

hope that Alexander could be convinced to yield upon

cl

pointn in order to �ake the issue of Saxony negotiable .

few
68

Ca.ot:i.;; reagh ' s method o f dealing with the Saxon

quo s t i on wac a bit different than that which he employed
in dealing with Rvssia ' s Polioh pretensions.

Castlereagh

realized that th� King of Prussia was quite under the
influence of the Emperor of Ruosia,
he could direct,

but he believed that

vd th �he cooperation of Austria, the weak

Prussiroi monarch to oppose the Russian claims in exchange
for Saxony.

69

Castlereagh first approached the Prussian monarch
to discover what hin thoughts were and found him a firm
advocate of Alexander but not attracted to his Polish scheme c .
The British minister then approached Prince Hardenberg,
plenipotentiary for Prussia,

the

and offered hi s views to him.

Hnrdenberg admitted that he did not agree with Alexander ' s
Polish ucheme .

but that Prussia could not afford to oppose

the Emperor of Russia unless they had Gome guarantee of being

68
caotlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, Decer.iber 5 t 1814,
Vlebster , .. The Polish-Saxon Question ., , Appendix, pp. 81- 82 .
69
castlereagh to Liverpool , Vienna, October 9 , 1 81 4 ,
Webster, "The Polish-Saxon Queotion " , Appendix, p . 7 4 .
?O
ibid.

70
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supported on the point of Saxony . 71
The next person whom Castlereagh approached was Princ e

Metternich

the plenipot entiary for Austria.

The Austrian

mini ster had no plan of action and Castlereagh
him with the necessity of uniting

v

then impressed

�th Pruss i a to keep Hus Gia

from gaining her demands in Poland . 72
Castlereagh then arranged a

meeting

between the

ministero of Austria and l>russia to enable them to discuss

the

proposed alliance o f interest directed against Russ ia.

This meeting proved that there was a realm of common interest ,
but the two would still. have some difficulty in getting
togethe r . 73

On October 22, 1814,
of their proposed

agreement

Austria sent a fo rmal outline
that Austria support Prus sian

cluino on Saxony in return for Prusoian opposition to Hussian
pretoncion3 in Poland .

Austria agre ed that Prussia wan t o

receive most o f Saxony ,

but

rece iving Mayenc e . 7

4

r>he would not agree t o Prus sia

Prussia,

announcement by Castlereagh,

although prepared for this

was ups e t ,

but through the efforts

of Ca.:.:;tlercagh the two part i e s a.greed to leave Iilayence

7 1 Ibid . , P •

7 2 Ibid . ,

Webnter,

p.

7
7

for

5.
5.

73castlereagh t o Liverpool, Vienna, October 24 ,
.
"The Poli sh-Saxon Question" , Append i x , p .
77
4
7 Ib id .

1814,

-
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lute� discussion . 7 5 Austria then agreed to permit the
provi si onal occupation of Saxony .

The provioion of the

oc cupat ion was that Prus sia support Austrian and British
opposition to :rus �ian de�ands in Polruid . 76
Castlereagh had ,
aonent

on October :i.2 ,

1814, t;iven hie

to the provisional oc cupat ion of Saxony by Prus sia

(:U1d t o the conce::;sion o f Saxony to Prussia up on natisfactory
zettlement of the Polish question.

Castlereach ' o adrai csion

of the oc cup�tion and eventual incorporation of Saxony by
Prus sia was ctuted ver-J strongly and clearly.

Castlereagh

wrot e ,
There is no principle in European politics t o which
I attach more importance than the effectual recon
struction of Prussia • • • We must all cling t o Prus 3ia
in such a cri s i s , it is upon her poVler that we must
look to assemble our� • • • I feel some individuG!.l pain
that so ancient a family should be thus s o deeply
effected, but I can fe el no moral or political
repugnance to this meanure • • •
Cuotlereagh then went on t o decry the guilt of the King of
Jaxony ,

and t o admit that ,

although their V!Gre other offenders

the King of Saxony vms the worGt .

of the European peace,

If

cll the othcrn rece ived leniency and he did not , it v10uld not
bother him that it was s o . 77

75rbid . ,
76
Ibid . ,

p.

p.

76

.

77 .

77Ca3tlereo.gh to Harr"' ;nberc;, Vie�via,
\'/clliD.£ton S . D . , Vol. IX, PP • 339-340.

October 12,

1814,
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On oc·tober 2 0 ,

1814 , Ca::;tlereach sent a letter to

Lord Liverpool defending his otand on Saxony ru1d condemning
the King of Saxony .

78

r.iost of hio condemnation

wo.c

baced on

the history of tl:c !{inc; • s loyalty to Napoleon and his refunal
to risk j o ininc the alli e s even whe'' tl:e defeat of lfapoleon
war.:; in night .

Th0 mo8t important po.rt of the letter in that

part in which he defended the Prussian claim 011 Saxony as
juctified.
But if it is o.cl.:d tted that the allieo
are to be compensated, and if this claim is
spec ially asserted and admitted in favor of
Russia, how can Russia be compensated but in
the Duchy of Warsaw [he was not here inferring
that Russia was to receive all of the Duchy of
V/arso."'' ] , and how can she be compensated in that
Duchy without the Gi>oilation of Prusoia?
And how can Prussia be indemnified, first,
for that compensation; and secondly , for her
exertions and losses in the co!ID!lon cause?
It is evident that if indemnified at all,
compen:::: ated at o.ll, it munt be from the dom.inion3
of come other power.
On whom then, on point of
justice , can that indemnification fall G O properly
as on that power who was the first and chief
instrument in the dimn.emberment of her stc.t e r:> ,
and by subsequent tergiversations , or pu.cill
animty, or a.mbi tion, of one of the chief cause:3
of the loc::>es she had experienced in recovering
parto of them?

He went on to a.sl\: how Rus sia. could receive compensation 2.t
the expense of Pru8zia if "Prussia is not to be compen:Jat ed
at the expen:::; e of Saxony ,
the com.rnon cau::;e •

Vienna,

3 5 8- 3 5 9 .

• •

?11

th0 ereutest enemy il.:. l..i�rman.y
<
of

Castlercach also claimed that the

78cactlercagh to Wellington

October 2 0 , 181 4 , Wellington

(enclosed to Liverpool ) ,
.§_.Q., Vol. IX, pp .

- 3 5-

Ki1-ig of Saxony lost his rights because o f hin criminal
behavior and ttwhere no rieht intervenes ,

the law of public

convenience and public utility takeo plac e ,
79
be c ontrolled by motivea o f clemency . 11
The

whi ch

cn.n only

st rong stand of Caf:1tlereagh on Saxony had been

weakened somewhat by November 1 1 ,
Lord. Liverpool that Prussia,

1814, when ha informed

by the exhort ations of the

Emperor of Rus sia on the King of Pru:Jsia against Hardenoerg,

h�»d fallen into agreement with Rucsia.

The Rus sian Emperor

had made similar attacks on Jia:etternich to the Emperor :F'ra.nciG
of Austria,
.

.

:11n1s t e r .

80

but Francis had stood firm in support of his

Now Castlereagh found it ne c e ss ary t o de fend t o
Liverpool the stnnd that h e had taken in favor of Prussia.
His de fense of his ac t i ons was s imp ly ·that he felt that if'

the Austrian and Pru.asia.� c ourt s could not b e b rought
agre m:ient both Poland and Saxony vrnuld be lo s t issues .
fear he held as

to Saxony

Se.xony hut rather that,

was

to
Th.G

not that Prus sia would receive

if Rus sia received,

without

�t rong

opposition, her demands in Poland , Alexander would use his
influence t o
R:eussian court

.

s et tle

the quention of Saxony and thus !na..
1\:e the

.

supreme on every L"D.l)
Ortant lSGue.
.

79Ibic"!.

81

80castlereagh to Live rp oo l , Vienna, Nove�ber 11 , 1814 ,
WebGter, 0The Poli sh-Saxon Qu e s t i o n u , Appendix1 pp. 78-79.

81Ibid.
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relations between Austria and Prus si a , at least ,
from ITovembcr 11 ,

1814. gradually declined

unt il

there was a

co:·1pl0te rupture , becfauce Pruo oin. had fallen c01aplet ely under
tl.te C.o:�inst ion of Runoio. caucillG Auctric. t o turn aeain3t

Pru.m:d.a • s clai:.aG in Saxony .

Castl• reagh continued his att empts

t o patch the breal{in& alliance and establish hin German centered
balance of power,

but from this point on fl.in efforts ·were increas-

ingly in vain.
Pru.snie.. wiching

to ac .
.. m
r
e her c laims in Saxony ,

the c o opera"!;ion of Ruo u i a ,

with

had the admini s trat i on of Saxony

turned over to' her by Prince Repnin o f Russia.

The givi:nt;

over o f formal control o f Sa."Cony on a temporary basis Vias in
accord with the a&reement that the Auctrian ,
Prunoia...�

mini st e rs

had

made

on C c t ober 22 ,

Dri t i s!'1,

1814.

and

However,

Prince Repnin,

in �is c i rculzr on the Prussian take over

indicated thn.t

it was pemnnent and unconditional and with

the o.c;reement of Austria and Englai1d.

This action produc e ·�-

a ere at deal of ill feelir.l{; on the pc.rt of both the Austrien
and 'British m:ini Gterc and reoul ted. in firm notes condemning

.
82
the action.
The British Purlia�ent was informed on November 2 1 ,
1814 �y Lord Cactlerea.gh in a letter t o Lord Liv�r_pool,

that

Auctria now insi8ted that Ru�sia and Prussic not receive their
claimc in Poland and Saxony .

Mette:rnich had caid that Austria

82Talleyrand t o Louis XVII , Vienna, November 17 , 1814 ,
I I , pp . 327-3 2 9 ; and Appendix I I I .

Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol .
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would
to

see

rather go

to

war

the Ruasians in

with vvha.t

force

she

thv.n.

could muster

the Pruosiru-is at Dresden.

Cracovie and

The British

plenipotentiar<J still exprecsecl Gome hope of

compromise ,

but the hope

dead.

Relationz

between

of an Austro-Prv.ssian cil ia.no�

Austria

another step to the point that

and

war

vvas

Prussia had disintegrated

was

spolcen of by

the

.Austrian cabinet and minister. 83
On

De c emb e r 5 ,

1814,

considered the s e tt l ement

Castlereagh wrote that

of the Saxon question the

issue , and that Metternich had

said

that

and of his own cabinet and p e ople

expre s s e d ,

mid

at thin point ,

cre at fear of

wo.r .

a

n.ny

alliance s .

Polan.a. had

.

One can r.; e e

'<Vere

should avoid

that , by thiD time , the
Austric.t
84

plan of

to opp c, oe

irussir.1.

weekn produced little exc ep t a greater

dispnrn.gement leading

inev it abl y to o.n

the foraer "all i e s .

The two weeks

u

to the

a war ·to coue about ,

completely destroyed.

The next two

in

Castlereagh openly

that , at this point , England

been

Germany,

C as tle reagh \'IC:LG c on c e rne d aG

CB.Dtlereagh for o.lly.ing Prussia and
in

P...l low

little hope o f cu1 early s e ttl ement

position that England would talce
but he sugge s t e d

imp ort ant

he could never

Frussia to have all of Saxony against the will of
general ,

he now

open rupture

bet·ween Deceraber :> ax1d

83caGtlereagh_ t o Liv ..:rpool, Vienno. ,
W e llington S . D . , V ol . IX, pp
447-448 .
84 � t
c s lereagh t o Live!'p o o l , Vienna,
Wellington Q.�. , Vol. IX, pp. 462-4 6 3 .
.

be tween

November 2 1 ,
December 5 ,

181,t ,

1814-,
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December 17 ,

1814, when the open ru:pturG finally o c curred ,

contained numerous gropings f o r a solution.
a

solution by giving the King of Saxor..y

left bank of the Rhine ;

thio was

war grew louder and the hope

of Talleyrand ,

Prus sia offered

small kingdom on the

re jected . 86

The demands for

T�is was the period when the

which had been c oming about slowly

through e.11 o f the weeks o f the C ongre s s ,
definite form,

J

for S c G tlement alm.o st dropped

from the realw of possibility.

ascendancy

a

8'-

began to take

and France began to be generally recogpized as

an import a...�t �ower in the Congre s s .
The relationship �>f Castlereagh and T alleyrand vvill
be analyzed in the next chapter dealing with the ascendancy
of Talleyrand .

() r;

(.))Talleyrand t o Louis A.-VI I I ,. Vienna, Decembe r 2 0 , 1814,
Talleyrand ��oirs , Vo l . II , pp . 371-372 ; and Cook to Liverpool,
Vienna, Dec ember 17, 1814 , Welli:ne;ton ,3 . D . , Vol. IX, pp. 48�-485 .

05

°

Web3ter,

-

Caetlereagh t o Liverp o o l , Vienna, De cemb er 1 8 ,
uThe
PoliBh-Saxon Que s t i on " , Appendix p . 84 .

i.j14,
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The 2.scendnncy of Talleyra
..
nd took place gradually
frorn his o..rri val o..t the Congress until he

· on the committee of the Pour Great Powers.
ascendancy can

be broke n

\Vas

finally accepted

The period of his

down into ceveral periods.

Prom his

urrival at tbe Congreso until th::� return. of the t'lonarchs frOJ:i
3uda early in November 1814, Talleyrand made v-ery little

headway .

The

December 1 7 ,

period be tween the return of the monarchs
1814 , when Cactleregh ' s plan

and Prus3ia v1a.!3 a total

of the breakdown which

failure

was

end war

an

d

for allyiri..g Austria

wao threatening because

taking place in the old alliance

bet\'veen Austria, Russia, PrusDia, and England , marked

a

period

of increaoing acceptance of Talleyrand by first the Auntrian a11.d
later the British ministers .
c,�cend2.l1cy

bega...'1.

o.n

The final period of Talleyre.nd ' s

December 17, 1814 when the open rupture

between Austria and Prussia took place

later) .

(this will be . explained

The ascendancy of the Prench minister was , in his

estimation, complete with the

signing of the Secret Defense

Treaty between AuGtria, Britain and France on Ja..11uo..ry 3 , 1815.
Talleyrand ' s general stand at the Congress had thre e
primary ol:ljective s .

Auntria,

He wizhed t o

Rusnia, Prus s i a

ra..n.d deoired to

malrn

see the

alliance between

and Great Britain destroyed.

Talley

Franc e one of the important powers in the

decision makine of the Congres s .

He winhed to have his principle

of "let:i t i��c;/ 11 recocnized a..'Yld used in ml?..kinc the settlement::;
n.t the Congre n c .
Ta.llcyr:;�ct. • :::.; principle o f " legitimacy"

W:]..O

best

expressed not by T2lleyrand hiooelf but by the Emp eror Frc.ncia
of Auotria when he caid t o Al exander I tI�o I'.:1peror of Rus s i a :
" A Prince cru.1,
domini ons ;

surrender a portion of his

he c anno t give up all of hiz country or all of

his pe ople .
heirs .

i f he winhe n ,

If hG abdicated his right pnsoec to hie legi tim.ate

He canno t de�1rive them of i t ;

the right to d_o co

• ..

Europe herself has not

B?

The principle of'

"legit imacy "

was

for Talleyrand his

fortreoc of connervaticm t o protect him from the fear of the
other powero of French radicalism inherited fror.i. the French
Revolut ion and t o ingratiate hira t o Louis XVI I I .

If Tclleyra.nd

could force a conclusion of the ai'fairs o f Eu.rope on nuch

France vrnuld ago.in be nu.rJbercd among

conservative principle ,
the c onservative pov·mrs.

In addition t o the favorable view

that the other powers would have of France ,

such , a principle

wan best for the settlement o f the i :mueo
:
at Vienna in
beneficial t o Fre.nce.

�

n

way

The main interesto of France wer;; to

�ee Saxony retained in order to prevent Pruosia from bec o:nint;
overly powerful n.nd
on tho Rhine .

a

threat in Gernany c..nd too creat a power

He wiched t o see the kingdom of Naplen returned

to a Bourbon Prince.

What better principle could Franc e apply

to Saxony than the principl e o:f "lr.1git imacy " so well stated by

87To.lleyra._nd

T<J.lleyrand Mer:io irs,

t o Loui o XVI I I ,
Vol . II, p . 3 5 5 .

Vierma,

Novei:iber 2 4 ,

1 814 ,

-42-

the Emperor of Austria'?
of thin analys i s ..

Naples is not the dir·oct concern

Briefly , France wished to see Murat , who

had with the aid of Nap oleon taken over ·the Kingdom of Naple s ,
and the Bourbons , who were �c.cording t o the Emperor

ousted,
Francis '

definition legitimate monarchs ,

QQ

reGtore d . u o

The principle of 11legitimacy , 11 although in apparent
conflict with the principle of expediency , which oaid that
Prussia de::rnrved Saxony as a replacement for her losseG in
Poland and as .Proper aggrandizement for he!' efforts against
Napoleon, was actually the principl.e of eJCpediency in that it
was the principle most .expedient for .Prance ..
One could generally summarize the a.t.i
"lbi tiono of Talleyrand at the Congress as the desire to restore France to the
position which she had held. in Europe before the l?rench
Revolution.

France would be wise to restore Europe to vn1at

it had been before the French Revolution. since the Treaty of
Paris haQ. restored France to approximately such a stat e . 89
During the first period, Talleyrand appeared to be not
too successful, but he retained his stand quite firmly and hoped
for a break among the "allies . "

He attempted,

qonvince �:Ugland to change her views on s��cony.

chiefly, to

He also

attempted to modify the views of Alexander and the Pruz.:siai.'1.c
and to

influence Metternich, but his chief objective was to

88Nicholson,

PP • 192-19 9 .

89see Appendix I I .
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change the view3 of Castlereagh.
The fir3t atter.1pt::; of Talleyrand to have the Congros:J
opened ar...d to disc ourage the dominat ion
haG

already

been neen in the s ec ond

of

it by the

"allies "

c hapt e r . 90

At the first meet ing s ,Talleyrand met with some succeno

in

thwart ine the "allied" plan

Congress .

the

f or

The semi-forr.aal meetingG

method of Talleyrand,

of

the

PoVIers

ceased. and

lilte the method of the other powe rs ,
Du.ri!J.6 rao ct of this period of

turned to personal diplomacy.
the Congre ss ,

openly (lominating the

nhen the dealings v1ere dominated by Castlereagh ,

Talleyrand contented himself with remaining \'/ell info:rmed on
developnents and issuing objections to the proposed settle;n.ent
of C as tlere o.gh .

L'Iuch of Talleyrand ' s efforts t o convince

Englroid to chunge her views on Saxony came not directly fron
Talloyrand but

from Paris to

Wellington who

was

Castlereagh via the Duke of

the British minister at Paria.

Durine most of the

early period,

t o influence the other pow�rs ,

91

Talleyrand made attempts

but his me.jar contacts

Sl:!nllar p owero espec ially the Gerr...aan Powe rs

such

were the

as Bavarie

and \'/urttemberg. 92 The French had little Gucce�s in press inc

9°suRra, Chapte r I , pp . 11-12 .

9J \'/ellington, S , D . Vol . IX, (All of the followir.ie lett ers
are to be found in Vol. l'x. ) Well inct on to Ca:::i t lercagh, Pari s ,
October 1 0 , 1814, PP• 325-326 ; October 1 8 , 1 814 , pp. 346-347 ;
October 2 5 , 1814, PP• 370-373 ; November 3 , 1814, PP• 402-403 ;
November 5 , 1814 , pp. 417-418; and November 7 , 1814, pp . 421-4 2 2 .
921·JUbasaadors o f the King at the Congresa t o the r.Iininter
of Foreign Affairs at Pari c , Vienna, September 2 9 , 1814, Tc.llcy
rand Memo irs , V o l . II , pp. 2 2 5 -226 .
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their principles at first , because England was quite opposed
t o France having aziy important influence at the Congres s .

93

Castlere3gh approached Talleyrand a number of times but alweys
in a spirit of guarantee ing that the Jt�rench would not turn to
The British minister was not seeking l!�rench

the Russians.

cooperation or s howing a willingness t o modify British views
in order to be more agreeable to those of the French.

9

4-

Most of Talleyrand ' s hopes centered on the Austrian s ,
because he knew the policy o f England toward �axony and felt
that this policy c ould only be coW1teracted by the refusal of
'

the Austrians to cooperate . 95 His belief in Austrian opposition
to the British support of Prussian claillls in Saxony was
extended beyond the period of the agreement of October 2 2 ,
1314 between Austria and Prussia.

The agreement was to allow

conditi onal oc cupation and eventual anne xation of Saxony by
Prussia if

she would support British and Austrian opposition

to Russ ia ' s pretensions in Poland . 96
IIIonsieur De Blacas ,

a member of Louis XVI I I • e cabine t ,

3
9 �1all13yrand to Louis XV I I I , Vienna ,
Talleyrand Correspondence, pp . 70-71.
4
9 castle reagh
to Liverpool , Vienna ,
Vlellillbton, S . D . , Vol. IX, PP • 323-325.

October 1 9 ,
October 9 ,

1814 ,
1814,

Am�a;

95
sadors o f the King at the Congress t o the �ini ster
of Foreign Affairs at P£>.ri s , Vienna, October 16 r 1814, Talleyrf.'l.nd
Memoirs, Vol . I I , pp. 2 5 5 -2 5 7 .

96Te.lleyrand to Louis XVI I , Vi em1a ,
Talleyrand Correspondence, pp . 71-73.

October 1 9 , 1814 ,
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gave Talleyrand his best support during the entire Congre s s .
During the early months ,

he was of ereat value to Talleyrn:.1d

because his informat ion to Wellington v;as passed very quickly
on t o Castlereagh and gave the British minister greater
assurances that the policies followed by Talleyrand were
in acreement with the lrrench Government . 97
From the very beginning of the Congres3,

Talleyran.d

correctly assessed the Prus sian and Russian C ourts as being
very closely allied on the Poli sh-Saxon queation . 98
Thi� recognit�on of their closeness prevented him from making
the same error which Castlereagh made in attempting t o gain
the favor of the Prussians in order ·to oppo�e the Russians.
Talleyrand stat�d at one

time that Castlereagh treated the

queotions of Poland and Soxorcy separately •
the Congress and its proceedings,
the questions were not ,

99

100

When one views

one can oee clearly

in reality,

that

t o be treated separately

since the claims of Runsia on Poland demanded that Prussia be
reirnbursed in Saxony,

and Prus o i an claims in Saxony were

only

9 7 supra, Footnote number 91. p . 4 5 . Wellington ' s
Dispatches tool{ from two t o three weeks t o arrive in Vienna.

98Talleyrand ·to Louis XVI I I , Viem'la, Jepteruber 27 , 1814 ,
Talleyrand Corres:eondonce pp . 6-10 ; and Ambassadors of the Kine
at the C ongress t o ihe Minister of Foreign Affairs at Pari s ,
Vienna, September 2 9 , 1814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. I I , FP •

225-226 .

l

99supra,

Chapter 2 ,

p . 19,

Footnote

OOTalleyrand to Louis �·� I I I ,
'I'a.lleyrand r�ernoirs , Vol . I I , p . 3 5 6 .

Vienna,

38.

December 7 ,

1814,
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admi ssable when considered as compensation for her l o s s e s in
Poland .
As early as October 1 7 ,

1814,

Talleyrand requested

Louis XVIII t o give him the power to make an alliance
promising military aid t o opp o s e Rus sia and Prussia although
at this t ime there
t o use this aid.
1814 ,

was

lOl

little hope that they would be able

During the interval ,

before October 1 7 ,

Talleyrand had received assurance from several o f the

small German Powe rs,

especially Bavaria,

give military support t o Austria.

that they would also

1 2
Talleyrand was ,
0

howeve r ,

uninformed about the pending agreement o f October 2 2 ,

1814,

between Austria and Prus sia on the dispo sal of Saxony .

l 3
0

Finally,

on about October 1 9 ,

1814 ,

Talleyrand began

to realize that Castle ragh was able t o direct Metternich to
support

Prussia

on the question o f Saxony.

Talleyrand

still hoped that the Emperor Franc is o f Austria would resist
even though his chief ministert Metternich,

had in Talleyrand ' s

opinion fallen completely under the influence of England . 10

4

1 1
0 Talleyrand t o Louis XVII I , Vienr1a , October 17 , 1814,
Talleyrand memoirs , Vol . I I , pp . 258-264.
2
10 Talleyra.nd t o Louis XVI I I , Vienna, September 2 9 ,
1814 , Talleyrand Correspondenc e , pp . 1-4.
l 3
ing at the Congress to the
0 Ambassadors of the
Mini ster of Foreign Affairs at Pari s , Vienna, October 2 1 ,
1814 , Talleyrand Memoi;r-s , Vol . I I , pp . 272-2 7 5 ; and Talleyrand
t o Louis XVI I I , Vienna, October 2 5 , 1814, Talleyrand l'demo irs ,
Vol. I I , PP • 275-281.
l 4
0 Talleyr.and t o Louis XV I I I , Vienna, October 1 9 , 1814,
Talleyrand Correspondence , pp . 71-73

K
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Just before the Emperor Alexander left for Duda . on
October 30,

and

1814, Talleyrand had an interview with him,

as a result of this he lost all hope of modifying the claims

of Rus si a or Prussia except by tJ...e threat of force.

The

interview which Talleyrand had with Alexander showed the
Emperor to have no inclination toward modification of his
claim!3 ,

and Alexander added t hat he assumed hi:nself to be

King o f Poland and the King of Prus s ia to be King of Saxony .
Until the return of the sovereigns from Duda,

l05

Talley-

ro.ntl • s effect had been barely ne gl igi ble . Be had gained
sor,1e support from the small powers, but this could be of'
little use

since all of them together could not counteract

the �ims of Alexander alone .

106

The first indication of a change taking p lac e in the
aligrunent of the powers came almost at the same t ime from
both England and Au8tria.
Great Powers ,

F11 etternich i ns i ste d to the other

on or about November 6 ,

181 4 ,

that Austria could

never agree to the defiles of the Saale falling into Prussian
ha11da .

Metternich also told Talleyra�d privately that

council of state

had taken place in Austria,

and it

a

wa3

decided as a matter of policy that S?...xony wo.s of more importa.nce
to Austria than was Poland .

l0

Metternich said that he hoped to

5Talleyrand t o Louiz XVIII, Vienna,
Talleyr2.nd C o rreoponden c e , p . 88.

October 2 5 , 1814 ,

0
1 6Even Louis XV I I I realized that the mn&'.ll powers
nlone were not enough and that at lem.>t one Greo.t Power was
needed.
Loui� XVIII to Talleyrand , Paris , Oc t obe r 14 , 1814,
Tall e�rrand C o rrespondenc e , P • 5 5 .
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save between three-fourths and four-fifths of Saxony and that
this VIOuld be a great acc omplishment for justice and the

general go oa .

1 7
0 Castle reagh reported t o Liverpool at this

time that the King of Prussia had fallen under the complete
in:fluence of the Emperor of Russia.108 Talleyrand wro t e to
Louio XVIII that Castle reagh had told him privat ely that he
still hoped to gain the

supp ort of Pruss i a in modifying the

views of Russia by offe ring her from four t o five hundred
thousand inhabitants in Saxony109 (castlereagh had already
promised Prus sia a.11 of Saxony if she would cooperate in

110
thwarting the deillands of Russia ) .

Taileyrand tended t o be come a bit too optimistic
when he rece ived the information relating to the Po l ishSaxon que stion from Castl ereagh and Metternich.

The good

news also caused Talleyrro1d t o become quite self-glorifying
in a letter to Loui s XV I I I . 111 The over-optimism and over_
assessment of T alleyrand of his role in the expected break

1814 ,

l
O?Talleyrand to Louis XVI I I , Vienna, Nove111ber 6 ,
Talleyrand
�moirs , Vol . I I , PP • 300-30 5 .

1, 10 8cas t lere agh 1:0 Liverp o o l , Vienna, NoYember
1
1814 , Webzter, "The Polish-Saxon Question" , Appendi:>: pp.

78-79.

l

09Talleyrand t o Louio XVI I , Vienna, November 6 ,
�yrand Memoirs , Vol . I I , p p . 300-301 •
ft
.J0antlerea.gh to Hardenberg, Vienna, October 12 ,
Wellington S . D . , Vol. IX, PP • 3 39- 3 40 .
lll,..:: --.
lley and t o Louis XVIII, Vi e nnn , November 6 ,
Tall.< ,f !'2..i."'ld M:emoi r s , Vol. I I , PP • 3 4-3 5.

1814 , Ta
1814 ,
1814 ,

;

0

0
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be·tween the "allies' has c aus ed. some historians to disregard
the c ont ribut i ons of Talleyrand .

pleaae the King ,
to this po int ,

Talleyrand did have to

and he did overvalue his contributions up

but he was still t o have an important and

strong impac t on the d e c i s i ons of the Congre Gs .

One c anno t

disregard the French minister because he tended to be

excessively self-glorifying and op·timistic at s o me points
during the Congress .
Vfhile Talleyrand was making headway at the Congre s s ,
Blacas was ma.¥= ing progre ss at Pari s . He reported t o Talley
rand that he had re c omm ende d an alliance to Wellington in
order to

oppose the desires of Russia.

Blac as said that

he had offered this alliance after W ellingt on ,
insisted that the i mp ort ant po int was Poland ,

could be kept out of Poland,
to the whole of Saxony .
not accepted,

as usual

and if Run s i a

Prussia would 11.av-e little claim

Although the overture by Blacas wa.s

Wellingt on was now, at le ast , beginning t o look

more t o France for support. 112 B lacas noted in his letter to
Talleyrand that Castlereagh • s instructions were not bein.g

well followed judging from the informati on furnished by
Wellington ll3

( Cas tle re agh

probably wrote his own instructionG ,

but if he did not they were so sparce and general that he could

112The Comte de Blacas D ' Alupo to T alleyrand , Fari a ,
November 9 ,
8 4 , Talleyrand Memoirs, Vol. I I , pp . 305-308.
1 1
l
l 3Ibid . , p . 3 0 8 .
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hardly have been bre::>Jcing them} .

Wellington reported to

Castlereagh about the c onversation which he and Blacas · had
had.

Wellington also reported tha·t Blacas had been quite

critical of Talleyrand and. that Talleyrand had been sent
inatructions to cooperate more with Castlereagh. 114
A few weeks after the discussions between Blacas

and Wellington had taken plac e , both Talleyrand s.nd .Castlereagh wrote that there had been a change in the tone of the
other and each credited it to the instructions that had been
sent to his c.ounterpart .

115

Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII

and stated that Castlereagh had been instructed to support
"

16 b

.Jaxony , 1

ut cas t lereagh never

re c e ive d
'

.
sueh ins
.
t rue t ions
"
_

Castlereagh wrote to Wellington and commented that Talleyrand
no longer thwarted

him as he had , and Castlereag:t. thanke d

the French court , believing them to have sent Talleyran.d
instructions.

117 Talleyrand like Castlereagh also did not

114
to Castlereagh , Paris , November 5 ,
vtellington
1314 , Castlereagh Correspond�nc e , Vol . X , pp . 1 83-185 .
ll5
castliereagh .t o Wellington, Vienna, Nove!'llber 2 1 ,
1814 , Castlereaeh CorresEondence , Vol . X , pp. 205-206 ; and
Talleyrai..d to Louis XV I I I , Vienna , December 7 , 1814, Talley-.
rand Memoirs , Vol . I I , pp . 354-357.

116T

alleyrnnd to IJcu.is XV I I I , Vienna, December 7 ,
1814 , Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol . I I , pp . �54-357.
117
castlereagh to Wellington, Vienna, November 21,
1814. , Ca:Jtleroagh Corres;po;ndence , Vol. X, pp. 205-206 .
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receive instructions.

By the time Castlereagh and Talley-

rand wrote their letters that the other was cooperating,
the interests of the two had grovm clone enough together that
thej' could begin to agree .

The slight misunderstanding of

each about the instructions of the other did greatly facilitate
the dealings of the two men.
Between the timf? that the letters to Castlereagh and
Talleyrand werG sent from .Paris and the time when they were
received ,

there was much happening to the poaitions of France

nnd England.

On about November 12 , 1814 , Talleyrand found

out fro� Metternich the details of the agreement of October
22 , 1814 in which Austria conceded to support Prussia ' s
Saxon claims in exchange for Prussian opposition t o Russie ' s
Polish d.emand 3 .

118

Fortunately, this agreement had been

contingent upon the cooperation of Prussia in ousting Russia
from Poland .

Metternich also told Talleyrand that he was

willing to yield a great deal in Poland but not in Saxony .
Talleyrand interpreted this as be ing an admission by Metternich
that he would submit to the der!lands of Alexander.

11

9

Alexander had been trying for some time to contact
Tnlleyrcmc: , and ,

just prior to November l 7 ,

Czartorys;<:i to talk t o Talleyrnnd.

1814 , he had �ent

Czartoryski approached

Talleyrand but the French minister refuzed to have any unusual
1

18Talleyrand t o Louis XVII I , Vienna, Hovember 1 2 ,
1814 , Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. II, pp . 311-315.
11
9Ibid.
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dealings with the Tsar.

120

Soon thereafter, Alexander saw

Talleyrand personally at a party and made an appointment to
see him.
Talleyrand , when he
Tsar,

ke pt his appointment with the

said he found him more agreeable ·than h� had been
During their conversation, they discussed the

previously.

Polish-Saxon question.

121

During the conversation with the Tsar, Talleyrand
admitted that he was not much interested in the PoliGh
que stion and that when Prussia and Austria were satisfied
he also would be .
wn.s

Talleyrand did infor.n Alexander I that he

in favor of an indb:pendent Poland aYJ.d th.at he would

support such .

Alexander admitted that a.n independent Poland

was an impossibility.

Talleyrand indicated to the Emperor
.

that he would have to support Austria until she had c ome to
an a5reement wi
• ti.n

122
Ru
ssia.
.

'l' alleyrand inforn1ed the Tr�ar, d.uring their convarsation,

that he was most concerned about Saxony .

Alexander

offered to cooparate in Naples if Talleyrand would cooperate
in Saxony.

Talleyrand answered that they had no point of

120

Talleyrand to Loui3 A-VIII, Vienna, November 17,
1814, Talleyrru.1.d �iemoirs , Vol. II , P • 3 2 0 . Talleyrand had
been requer:ted by Czart oryski to :make an appointment v;i th the

Tsar through an unusual sourc e , but Talleyrand feared that this
\�./oulcJ. creat e suspicion on the part of England and Austria.
121
Ibid . , PP • 321-326 .

122

Ibid.

r.:

-) 3 -

di3agreement in Na:p l e ::.; .

The Emperor f'inally said that he

had given his word t o the Prussians ,

it.

and he coul d not break

Talleyrand suggested that Alexander return some of the

Polish terri tor<J which he claimed t o Pru.ssiu in order to
c onvince Prussia t o relinquish part o f her claim in :;:;axony
so that

a

portion of Saxony could remain an independent
Alexa..11.der I c o ns i de re d this a very singular

kine;dom.

proposal .

Finally , Alexander admi tted that if Talleyrand

could convince the Pruss ians t o release him from his promise
he V/Ould agree t o Talleyrand • s demand s . 123 Lat e r ,

when

Talleyrand wrote to the King he optimisti cally expresse d a
belief that Alexander regretted his commitment ,

and if he

could find a way out he would not support the Prunsians.
?rince Talleyrand ,
Alexander,

124

just after his meeting with

discovered that Prince von S chwarzenberg,

uno"ther

AuGtris11 mini ster (who was to become chief minister after the
fall o:f flretternich in 184 8 ) , had just talked t o AleXCl.J."'lder.
Schwarzenberg had Vlarned the ErJ.:p eror that ,

if he continued

following the same poli o::,� of persisting in his demands in
Poland and supporting Prussian claims in Saxony ,
soo!l be a war.

ther� would

This threat of war mucl1. concerned Alex2..ncler

and he replied. that if it were :p os s i bl e he would char1ge ,

123

Ibi d . , PP • 3 4-325 .
2
124Ibid . , PP • 325-326 .

but
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he had gone so far that he could not . 1 2 5
Soon after his

convernation wit r.. Schwartzenberg,

Talleyrand dis covered from Metternich that Austria had sent
troops to the border.

Talleyrand becan to hope thc:..t the

Vienne cabinet was starting to
l e thargy .

rise fro� its state of

126

Talleyrand ' s hopes for the revival of the Vi enna
cabinet were further raised when .Metternich informed him
that he had approached Prince von Wreda { the
for Bavaria) about an allianc e ,
with certain qualifications.
firs t ,

chief plenipot entiary

and von W¥treda had agreed t o it

He made the following demands :

that France be included in the treaty;

second,

"that

Bavaria should furnish twenty-five thousand men and no more ,
for every hundred thous and that Austria put into the field ; "
last ,

that i f ,

"Ene;land granted subsidies t o Austria,

Bavs.ria

chould rece ive a part proportionate to their reopective
forceu . "

Talleyrand admitted that this would not be lik:elJr

t o tD.ke place soon,

but the mere fact that it

vm.s

bei!".£

considered showed that a great chonge had taken place .

12

7

A conversation next took place between Talleyrand
nnd the mini�ter of Saxony.

The Saxon mini ster provided

128
e circu
ThJ.s
'
Talleyrand wi' th th
•
l ar of Prince Repnin.
.1.

1814,

.

.

.

2
1 5Talleyrand t o Louis XVII , Vienna,
Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. I I , p . 3 2 6 .
12
6Ibid .
2
1 7Ibid . , PP• 326-327 .

123see Appendix I I I .

November 1 7 ,
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is sued upon the exchange of Russian and Frun sian

circular,

occupation of Saxony ,

indicated that Austria and England

had. given their absolute assent to Prus sia permanently taJring
over uaxony as a oepara.Ive 1
tinedom. 1
(""'f

.

29

The circular of Prince Repnin cause d a great deal of'
com.�otion.

It caused both Castlereagh and Metternich t o issue

strong statemento in opposition t o it .

l

30 The c ircular

aroused Castl ereagh t o come t o see Tc.lleyrand and tell hiCT
that he wished t o settle Poland as quickly as po�sible and
get on t o Saxony which the Austri an ' s considered much more
important .

The circular by Repnin also was the signal for

Bavaria to declare that they would mB:ke no agreement on the
Ger.n.an Confederation unt i l the existence of
kingdom of Saxony was guaranteed.
mini ster,

.t he King and

Hardenberg,

the Pru:::i s ian

admitted that h0 could allow the retention of'

So.xony of at lea�t one mi],lion in population,

a

but thi :::; would

not be at all official until the King of Prussia approved
it.

1 1
3
Talleyrand at this point ,

was quite

he v1ar; not yet o.ble t o form the allianc e .
on :November 2 5 ,

1814 ,

optimi s t i c ,

but

A fev1 dayn later,

•ralleyrc:md wrote to Louis quite dis-

couraged with the passage of events iL the rec ent clays .

2
1 9Talleyrand t o Louis XV I I I , Vienna, 1�ovember 17 ,
1 814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol . II , pp . 32 7-328.
l

JOibi d . ,

1 3 1 Ibid.

pp .

328-3:]0.
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Ca::;tlereagh fearecl the int e rf e ren c e s of France c-..n.d, according
to Talleyrand ,

Prussia.

felt hi!!!.s elf otill in lc:F,,,I_,rue with Russia and

Castlereagh d i d opeak o f

war

if tl��

liussia.ns

pa sed

::;

the Vistula, but s till he did not want t o involve 1'..,ra.Ylce

milita.rily . 1

32

The short period of pessimism which Talleyrand under
went was soon to vanish beca.v.s e ,

on Dececrber 5 , 1814 , Talley-

rand learned seve ral thingc which he considered especially
good news .

1 33

The French minister was inf orme d , falcely,

that Castlere,agh had received orders t o support Sa.."{ony .

1 "' 4
J

Alexender had approached Franc is of Austria to find out if

Metternich had been lying t o him about Austri a ' s determination
to support the King of Saxony .

The Bmperor of Austri� info rme d

him that hi:.:> principles demanded that Au.stril:'. support Saxony •

13 5

Prince ��etternich wrote a l e t t e r to the Prur-;aie..ns and ins isted
that ,

according to

his statistics, no more of S2.Xony thun

3 00 , 000 inha.bi tan ts could be added to Prum:; iv..

l

3G The Pru:
:.> Gio.n

l 32Talleyrand t o Louis A.1iI I I , Vienn::!., N o...re::1ber 2 5 ,
1814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. I I , pp . 1 5 8-169 ; nnd Cu� tl e 
reagh to Live rp ool, Vienr1a, Deceober 5 , 1814-, We llingt on 3 . D . ,
Vol. IX, pp . 462-465 .
lJJTalleyrand t o Louis x.VII I , Vienna,
1814 , Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. I I , p . 3 5 4 .
l
34-Ibid.

December 7 ,

1 3 5 rb i
. d . , P • 3 .).: 5 •
13
6Amb2.ssadors of the Kin(;; c,t the Gongrecs to the
Minicter of Foreign Aff airs at Fari n , Vienna, December 14 ,
1814- , Talleyre..nd Liemoi r s , V o l . I I , pp . 3 61-3 6 3 .
-
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portion of Saxony could not ,

according to I1fotternich,

upper Lucati£� because of the d e f i le s of' Gab le

include

(this was the

route tJ:...rougr... Bavaria us e d by Napoleon in 1813 ) . l3 7 Pinally,
Alexander

agreed to the formation o f a �ingdom of Pole..nd

which c o uld be no larger than one -hal f the size of the kinGclom
before the Napoleonic Wars . 13
By December 17 ,

1814-1

8

there was no doubt that the

alliance had ceased to exist . 139 Castlereagh informed

I1iverpool that t:he re had ·been a diplomat i c explosion betv:een
F:russia m1d Austria.

I/I etternich,

in spi t e of the c onsul tat ions

of Castlereagh, had sent a letter t o t he Pru.ssians denying

all of
so

the ir demands in Saxony .

arous e d

The letter sent by Metternich

Hardenberg that he reve al e d t o Alexander the p ri vat e

c o rrespondence which he a.."ld Metternich had exchanged concerning

Pr-us3ian 2.11.d Aus t ri an c onbined opposition to frusnian pre
tensions in Poland . 140 Alexander v1as inc ens ed by t hi s revelat i o n
and

v:ent to Francis the Emp eror of Austria, because the

inference attached

to the revelations of the con1municationG

l37 T all eyrand to Louis 1.'VIII, Vier.J.1.c. , December 1 5 ,
1814, Tall eyrand Memo irs , Vol . I I , .PP • 363- 3 6 9 .

138Ibid . ,
PP• 368-369.
l 3 9Talleyrc-...nd t o Louis XVII I 1 Vienna, December 20,
1814, Talleyrand idemoirs, Vol . II , pp . 371-372 ; and Castle.
reach to Liverpool,

�·�· •

Vienna,

Vol. IX, PP• 483- 4 8 5 .

December 17 ,

1814, Wellingt on,

· e1121C?.t
1 4°c asi;
· i ereagn t o .LJl.ve r:p o o 1 , v1
1 814 , Wellington, S . J2. , Vo l IX , lJP • 483-485 .
·

-

·

)e c emb er i·7 ,

'
J
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was that Austr·ia had bro1cen faith with Russia.

The Emperor

Francis called Uetternich into the discussion between he and
Alexander.

Metternich then vtas forced to reveal his communications

viith Hardenberg which displayed a gre ater breach of faith on
the part of Pruss i a than on the part of Austria.

141

The Emperors of Austria ruld Russia then discussed the
issues of Poland and Saxony ,

aiLd ,

at this point ,

more conciliatory than she had ever been.

Rusoia was

Apparently embarrassed

by the actiono of Prussia, Russia offered Austria the district
of Ternopole with its 4 0 0 , 000 inhabitants.

Te rnapole would

not help the Austrians on their front ier, but i t was the best
offer thus far made by Russia.

At thi z point , Castlereagh,

although the alliance wa� dead,

suw some hope for settlement .

142

The f orraer allieo had agreed to forrn a s-tatintical
com.11ittee to establish how the population of Austri a , Prussia

and Russia could best be restored to that of the period I'rior
to the Napoleonic Wars .

The statisti cal committee ' � chief

concern was with the population demand of Prussia in Saxony
and Russia in Poland.

Castlereagh presented the plan for a

statistical com1J1ittee to Talleyrand , and Talleyrand approved

of it wi-Ch the demand that li"'rance be seated on the corn.ini tte e .
Prussia objected t o the seating of Fra.l1ce on the conu11i tte e ,
but Castlereagh demanded aJ1d received approval of the s e ating

14l
142

�bid.
:rbid.
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of

French representat ive .

o.

leave Vienna if one of

t hreatened to

Talleyrand had

ministers was not placed

his

com.ini ttee. 14 3

on the

The statintical committee was composed and convened
about Dec ember

24,

1814 , and , when
won a

Talleyrand had

the alliance was

broken bef'ore

on the otutistical committee,
ninioter on

the

right

ma j o r victory .144 Although

the French minister

the placement of the

the committee was an

French power and

rn.inister was

deal with the Four Great Powers

accepted on this committee t o
as an equal ,

a Frenoh

was placed

French

off ici al recognition of

of France to

deal

as an

equal

\•1ith tho Great Powers,

Castlerengh informed Liverpool on December
that

he

had had

Fcllld had

been

25, 1814,

a discussion with Talleyrand and that Talley

very urgent in his

reque st for

on

al li ance.

14 5

Castler0ach had at this t ime not decided upon the necessity
of

an

alliance, but he did admit

Austrinn,

the

and Britioh cooperation on

importance
the

of French ,

matt e r of Saxony .

146

143

coolt to Liverp o ol, Vienna, Dece:.nber 24, 18l11r,
Wellint;ton, S . D. , Vol. IX, pp. 502-503 ; Talle.:y:rand to Louis
x-VIII Vienna, December 28,
8147 Talleyrand Ll emoir s , Vol. I I ,
A
1
ing at the Congress to
pp . 317-3 7 9 ; and Ambassadors of �he K
the Minister of Foreign A ffai r s at Paric, Vienna, :::>e ce:nber 27,
1814, Talley rand Memoirs , Vol. I I , PP • 374-37 5

.

144Thii3 hacl been Talleyra..."'1.d ' s pri2:i.ury aim sir.:.ce the
beginning of the Coneress. Sul:Jra., Chapter I , p . 8 .
145
cantlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, December 2 5 ,
1814, Wellin�ton, G.D. , Vol. IX, P • 511.
l46 IbiC. . ;
Talleyre.nc1 to Louio XVIII , Vienna, December
2 8 , 1814, Taile yrand Memoirs, Vol. I I , pp . 377-378.

�d
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On Dec ember 2 9 ,

Ru.soia. and Pru.s sia,

1814, the Powe�s, Au�tria, Britain,

cent representative to meet to settle the

issuez involved with the T�ar ' o Pol i nh demands and Prussia ' s
Saxo:1 pretencions.

1

47 The British,

as well as the F rench ,

sav1

the8e co�..ferenceo ac a hope for the peaceful settlement of the
in8uea involved in Poland and eventually thoae of Saxony . 1
o n Decm:iber 31 ,

However,

Rucsia,

48

1814, Prussia, with the support o f

ins ued a declaration to the assembled Pov1er E:i that ,

Prussia did not receive Saxony ,

Russin and Pruss ia would

connider the denio.l aG an act of v1ar .
Castlereagh,

who ,

if

14

9

as i s pointed out very well by c .

Webster in ":E.'ngland and the Polinh-Saxon Que s t ion ,

K.

had never

"

before been "bullied" v1hile at the Congreso ,

was extremely

upset by the Prussian and Rus sian ultimatum ,

antl went to T�lley-

rand sugge3ting un al li anc e between Aus tria,

France und Great

Dri tain.

l5

0 In

o.

letter to Liverpool on January l ,

1815, he

defended hie proposal of an alliance :

l

47metternich Memoirs,

Vol.

II,

pp.

5 6 5 - 56 9 .

l48Ambassadors of the King at the Congre so to the
Iiiinioter of Foreign Affairs at Pari s , Vienna, December 27,
1814, Talle yrand Memoirs, Vol . I I , pp . 374-377 ; and Cantle
reo.gh ·to Liverpool, Vienna, January 1 , l ��, 1 5 , \''1eb st er "The
Polinh-Suxon Que stion , " ApP endix :P • 88 ..
l49
castlerea.gh to Liverpool , Vienn�, Jn.nuary l , 1 81 5 ,
\'/ebster "The Poli nh-3axon Question , " Appendix p . 88.
l 50
webster "The Poli nh-Saxon Question , 11 p . 6 6 .
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This sort of principle openly announced in a formal
conference in the name of two gree:1:t .P owers avowedly
making Common Ca.us e , and having la�ge Armie s ready
t o act , has appeared to Us to call for some pre
cautionar� corrective by which the other Powers may
be induc ed to feel that , in the d i n charge of their
functions in C ongre s s , they a.re not exposed individually
and in detail t o the des truc tive Effects of such a
comineering dictation.
Under these Circumst�.J.1ces I
have felt it an act of Imper�tive Duty to concert with
the French and Austrian Plenipotentiaries a Treaty of
defensive Allie.nee , confined within the ntrict necensity
of this mofft Extraordinary Case . 151
Talleyrund wrot e t o Louis A
'VIII on January 4 ,

1815,

and in the ut!l'ost

jubilation told him of the contraction
"
l e:
of the alliance . :1 .... He mentioned the fact ·that Castlereagh

brought the alliance to llim and that it was acceptabl e .
Talleyrand ' s greatest

jubilation was over what the alliance

meant .
The spirit of the c o alition and the coalition itself,
had survive d the pe ac e of Pari s ..
r!Iy correspondence
up to the present date offered numerous proofs of i t .
I f the pro j e cts that I found established. here on ny
arrival, had been put into execution, France would have
fo1.ll1d herself, for some fifty years , isolated in Europe
All
without friendly interc ourse with a s ingle power.
my efforts v1ere directed to preventing such a miofortune ;
but my most sanguine hopes never went s o far as t o lead
me to expect c omplete suc c e s s .
But now, sire. the coalition is destroyed, and
destroyed forever .
Not only is France no longer
isolated in Europe ; but your Majesty has already a
federe.l sy3tem cuch a.s fifty years of nego tiationn
out no prospect of giving .. 153
held

l 1
5 castlerengh t o Liverpool , Vienna , J n11uary 1 , 1815 ,
Webster "The .Polish-Saxon Que stion11 Appendix p . 8 8 .
l
52Talleyrand t o Louis Jf\JIII , Vi0nna, J2WJ.uary 4 , 1 81 5 ,
Toileyra.nd Memoirs , Vol. I I I , pp. 385-3 8 6 .
153Ib
J..' d . ,
--

p•

"' 86
.)

•

,,
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Talleyrand went on,

in his letter to Louis XVI I I ,

to

credit the success of the French at the Congres s t o God and
some other factors espec ially him�elf

•·

Aft er God, the efficient ca.uses of this
change have been the following:
My letters to Prince Metternich a:nd Lord
Cantlereagh and the impre m:dons they produce d :
The hints dropped t o Lord Castlereagh
re lat ive to an agreement \Vi th France • • • ;
The care I have taken to quiet hie suspicions ,
by showing , in the name of Franc e , the most perfect
disinterestedne s s ;
The peace with America, which • • • has left him
more free to ac t , and has given him more courage ;
Fina.lly 1 the claims of Russia and PTU3sia • • • ;
and, above all , the tone in which the claims have
been advanc e d and sustained in a conference between
their_ plenipotentiaries and those of Austria.
The
arrogant tone t �iken in this shameful and prepocterous
do cument [the threat to go t o war if Prus sia did not
get Saxony ] so wounded Lord Castlereagh that , for
saking his habitual calm, he exclaimed that the
Russians were c l aiming to lay dmvn the law , and that
England ·would accept i t from no one . 154
The asc endancy o f Talleyrand espe cially in his own
opinion,

was complete \Vi th the signing of the Secret Treaty.

From this point to the conclusion of the affairs of both Pol8.l1d
and �'Jaxony ,

the dealings were

to have a different complexion.

The 3:Ldeo were now clearly drawn .
with England and Aus tria,
and Prus sia.

France was to be in allia..'1.ce

and . their opponents were to be Runsia

The sympathies of most of the smaller powers were

to lie with the three new allies l'.'ather than 'Ni th the powers
of the north.
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The rise of Talleyrand can be credited to a number of
factors .

Baoioally,

Talleyrand was correct in his assessment

of the reazonc for his success at the Congre G s .
ca.une of Talleyrand ' o ascendancy ,
rand ,

The chief'

which was omitted by Talley-

wns that circ1.lmstances had done raore

to place hi� in the

poci ti on of an e<iuul ·than all of hit:> own efforts.
muct not be din credi ted in his rise ;

Talleyrand

he ·took full advantage of

all favorable changen of c ircumctance ,

and he did all in his

power t o implement the brealc up of the old alliance without
going too far and getting France placed completely outside
the c onfidence of the

''allies:• One of Talleyrand • s great est

pointo of favor was that he held firm t o his stated principles

o.nd did not allow them to be changed or compromi sed without
ntronc cause .

After Talleyrand had acc omplishe<l his major

c;o3l of destroying the old coalition a.gain.st Franc e ,
c.

K.

Webster wrote ,
The fact ,

he,

i··5
"did not strike a ha.rd bargain. " ::::>

as

that Talleyrand VJas williP..g to compromi se

D..fte r the coalition was destroyed and the position of France
guaranteed.,

proves that the French minister ' s principles were

u::>ed because they v1ero the best ,

in his est imat ion,

in. the redevelopment of Frc.rw e .

Once the security of France

was

guE:.rant eed ,

for aidine

Tcllcyrru:1d ' s principles could be bent a £reat

ce::..i .

155webster,

"The Polish-Saxon Question , " P •

62 .

ClIAPTEH IV

THE POLI SH-SAXON SETTLEMENT
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Austrin,

Great Britain nnd Franc e signed the secret

Treaty of Defenae on January l ,
of the treaty,
to subside .

l815.

l

56 After the signing

the threat of war although still current began

The powern now aligned

clearly could make their

demands a.
'Yld conceusions in a more positive manne r.
The powere agreed to the admi ssion of Frs.nc e t o the
committee of the Great Powers and ,

on January 8 ,

France becrune- the Fifth Great Power offically.
ca.in the 130sit i o n a s the Fifth PoVFer,
in part ,

his principles .

181 5 ,

l

57

In order t o

Talleyrand had t o sacrific e ,

The Powern of the Committee of Four

dcilla.nded that Talleyrand accept their conclusion that the
decision8 on Saxony would ba made with no reference to the
Xi!l£ of Saxony ,
decisions,

mcnt .

and that if the King did not accept their

Saxony would be placed under a provisi onal govern-

Talleyrn.nd did add that tho only thing which would

finally make the decisions on Saxony legaJ. would be
conGent of the King,
qualificution.

1
58

but he did

finally

the

agree to admit their

'J'.he question of Poland vm.s taci tly settlea. between
January 8-11 ,

1
l
l

1815.

The Emperor demanded all of the Duchy of

56sec Appendix IVa

57Metternich Thiemoirs,
5Bibid.

pp .

::>G0-::;69.

66

-

Warsaw except GenGen and Pouen;
he VIOuld give to Prus s i a ;

-

s ome · part n of old Prussia which

a mnall t e rritory on the right ba.."'1..k

of the Vistula which he would give t o Aus t ria ;

Thorn vfl1ich were to bec ome free cities .

and Gracow and

The demands of

Alexander v1e re allowed with no d i s cus s i on by the Five Powers.

l5 9

Alexander did agre e later t o permit Thorn t o go t o Prussia in

order t o convince her t o agree on Saxony ,
be co me a free c i ty .

16 0

and so

Th o rn did not

T:h.e final decision on Po land wao not reached until
Februc:i.ry 11, 1815 , but there was no material change at that
tirae .

As a re sult of the official agreement Alexander received

127, 000 squarP. kilometers and 3 , 200, 000 people of the old Duchy
of Warsaw to be set up as the independent k ingdom of Poland
tmtler the Kingship of Alexander I .

and Austria retained Galicia.
waf:l

Prussia retain�d Posen,

Gracow and the �urround ir.,e urea

mc::.de a f re e city of 1 , 000 square kilometers and 95 , 000 in

popu1a-t ion.
.

161

The quention of Saxony , which had been considered of
grave importance only by Talleyrand at the beginning of the

Congre s s ,
t o n olve

wac now the chief problem and the most thorny one

.

Prusr;ia still demanded all of Saxony ,
mininter,

l

The Prussian

Prince .Hardenberg aereed to the grruitine of the

5 9Ibid.

l GO
!t'Ietternich Memo irs , p .
161
tacho1Gon, p . 1 79 .

576 .
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King

of 3a.."'Cony a kir.gdom on

Castlereagh believed

that

it \-vould plac e too weak

a

the left bank

thio pro ject was

of

the Rhine.

imposoible

because

62
power under French influence . 1

Talleyrand also strongly disapproved of the proposed Saxon

1
kingdom on the left bank of the Rhine . 6 3 The British

plenipotentiary was most ,pleased with the action of Talleyrand in renpect to the proposed left ban.le kingdom for the
King of Saxony .
for a

'ralleyrand stated that although the plan

left b3l'lk kingdom would benefit any future French

ambition, he had to re j ect the plan

because it

was wro�o:

according to the principles of justice and righteousness .164
The

Austrian

granting
l�e

minister, F.1etternich, was not as opi:iosed

t o t he

of a left bank kingdom to the Kit1..g of Saxor..y as

wrw to Prussia receiving Torgau and Erfurth (two Saxon

fortresses)

• 16 5

The Austrian cabinet had been expected to off er

a

colLYJ.ter project to the Prussian pro ject which dema.i."'lded all
of Saxony in exchange for

a

kingdom of 500, 000 on the left

bank of the Rhine . The Austrian minister finally did offer
162castlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, Ja..YJ.uary 8, 181 5 ,
Webster "The Polish-Sn..."{on Question" , Appendix pp . 90-91.
1 3
6 Talleyrand to Loui o XVIII , Vienna, January 6 , 181 5 ,
Talleyrand Correspondence , pp . 249-252.
16 4castlereagh

to Liverpool , Vienna, January 5 , 1815 ,
Wellington S . D . , Vol. IX, P P • 527-�28.
16
5 a;;tlereag_h. t o Liverp o o l , Vienna, January 22, 181 5 ,
Vlebster ''The Polish-Saxon Que stim:1 f! ' Appendix P • 93 .

�

-GBo.

ccunter pro j e c t but only after great modification8 had

tPJcen pluc e .

Auctria ori�ino.lly v1ished t o deny Pru.3sia the

fortres3es of Torgau a.11d Erfurth,

but Ca.stlcreaeh demanded

th�t thene remain or he would vii thdraw from the alli2..nce
they had rec ently fo rmed with Franc e .

Austria finally bowed

to the de�ands of C an tl ere agh and did no t domand tho two
fortre o s e s ,

but they did refuse to permit Prussia ·to talce

1

.
.
16 6
ei:psic.

Talleyrand

had

be en aware of the Austrian demands and

syr.ipathized with them,

but he also a{;I'eed to nave

modified.

however,

Tnlleyra.nd ,

vms

theo

not too happy with his

now allies a.nd wrote to Louis XVIII that Mette:tnich was weak,
and Castlereagh had supporte d the Prussia.n side t oo l ong.
Finally,

16 7

a prop o s al \r;as submitted to Prussia by Austrir.!.

and England,

and it did perz:ri t Prus oia · to retain Torg£'�U and

'Erfurt!1 ,

it -r.efused Leipsic t o the Prussians.

but

Castlereagh

knew that Leipsic was of great importance to Prussia ac a pri z e ,
�, reei that i
· t i1 aa.
.� he 1..
�: 1
· d no -..
bu"t.

· 11
· -c;n.ry
·
rni

va
1ue

1 .
f or 't· h0:i

Cuctlercv,,gh deni ring the acceptance o f thin propo oul,

it

was

163

since

ne aring the time for him to l e ave and he did not want

to le2.ve a...."1.y of the matters uns e tt led ,

approached ·the R.inperor of

166cactlerea.gh t o Liverpool, Vi enna, Ja.�uary 2 3 , 1815,
W eb n t e r "The Polish-Saxon Que otion " , Appendix p. 96 .
167
Talleyrand t o Louis XVII I , Vi enna , January 1 9 , 1815,
Tclleyrand 11emoiro , Vol . I I I , pp. l�--1 .
168castlereogh t o Liverpool,
Webster "The Poli ch-Saxon Question" ,

6

Vienna, Jro1uary 2 9 ,
A:p13endix p p . 96 -97 .

1 81 5 ,
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Runsia,

and Alexaz.
�dcr agre e d

to give Pruss i a Thorn and its

environs . 16 9 The offer of Thorn did not satisfy the Prussian.8 ,

and Castlereagn increa�ed his off er by reduciug the demands of
Hanover by fifty thousand ond permitting the removal of an
equal nunber from Holland .

The Prus o ia..� minister

was

o ti ll

1
ver-y hesitant , but re finally accepted. 70when C as tl e reagh
prenented the proposal -�o I�1ett ernich,
hesitation but not

he felt that too

so Talleyrand.

great

�alleyrand objected because

a sacrifice was be ing demanded on the

part of tile King of Saxony.
arrangement for Saxony,

he s igned without

In spite of hin

objectionn to the

the French minister agreed t o the

cettlement be caus e he did not wish to be disl oyal to his nev1ly

1 1
made alliea . 7

The final proposal for the settlement of Saxony was

a.zrccd upon February 6 , 1 81 5 .
at gave

The settlement finally arrived

8axony and her Kine about one-half of what she had

originclly had with oo:nevihc.t more in p opulati on ;

Pru.ssio.

received tho larger BOographic portion of Saxony but a smalle r
population than the King of Saxony retaine d .
the

Also included in

nettlement of Saxony , Prussia re c e ived Thorn and the area

surroimdi ng i t .

Webs t e r

17

2 Tall eyrand

was

not happy \'Ji th the final

16 9ca:::: tlereagh t o Liverpoo l ,
11The P ol i sh Saxon Que ntion " ,
l?O i

'
·. ,
bi_
a

�

�

-

Vier.no..,

February 6 ,

Appendix p . 9 9 .

PP• 99 100 •

l
l7 ibid . , pp .

-

100-101 .

172rnetternich Memoir.§!.,

Vol.

II , pp .

5 76-577 .

181 5 ,

-70settlement , but he stated that it was the best that could
be gained without war, and he

was

satisfied that f>a.xony

did , at least , still remain as a third class power which
she had been before. 17 3
l7 3Talleyrancl t o Louis XVI I I , Vienna,
181 5 , Tall0yrand raemoirs , Vol. II I , pp . 3 4- 3 8 .

February 6 ,

CF-APTER V

CONCLU3IOU
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An n.nalysis of the contributions of Castle reueh and
Talleyrand can lead one

t o the falne conclusion that one or

the other r.um wan of greater importance in the final settle
nent of the Polish-Saxon question at the Congres s of Vienna.
In looking at this text,
that Talleyrand
ment .

wns

one ca.n be led to the opinion

the most important figure in the settle

This mioconception of the importance of Talleyrand i s

cauoed primarily because Castlereagh ' s policy at the be·ginning
of the Congre s s met with failure .

There io a tendency in man

to equate success �with pre-eminence,

but in the solution of

the Polish-Saxon question this is not necessarily so .

As a generalization, other treatments of the Congreos and
the Polish-Saxon question have tended t o emphasize the contri

butions of one rnru1 over those of the others present at the
Conv.<Te s s .

Credit for the Poli sh-Saxon cettlement han generally

been accorded t o either Talleyrand or Cantlereagh .
credited the settlement

Some have

t o M:etternich.

Talleyrand and Castle reagh ' £i cont ributions t o the
Polish-Saxon settlement were very nearly equal ,
the contribution of one

man

and t o value

over tl1at of the other i s

an

error.

When comparing the contributions of the two men it is important
t o exa�ine their general policies and succeGoes,

but more

important than the policies or thG successes of either individual
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is the actual contribution each made t o the settlement .
Ca8tleree.gh placed Austria n.nd Prussia as alli e s ,
but at this time they c ould not become permanent allies
because of the Gerr.io.n rivalrJ and ·Ghe ascendancy of Prus sia
which would in the next fifty years completely replace
Austria as the most important and powerful Ge rman State .
Castlereagh led the discussion of the Cone;ress on the Poli ::::h
Saxon question on the impossible path of Prus�ian-Austrian
alli5nment for several months.

Even after the obvious

failure of hif:! attempts t o unify them,

Castle reagh continued

to ro.nk high the re-creation of a powerful Prussia.

Castle

rec:..gh sav1 France as the ttll'eat to future European peace and
Russia as a strong oe cond t o France

as

a threat.

Talleyrand recognized the threat o f Pru.ssia to both
Austri� and Franc e .
his dealings ,

but ,

He claimed the support o f principle in
in reality , - hi s principle was primarily

one of French expediJncy whi ch happened t o take the form of
"legitimacy . "

During the discussions at Vienna,

Tulleyrand ,

although thwarted in the early portion of the Congre s s ,
eventually saw his primar� aim fulfilled.

Tn.lleyrand ' s aim

\'1as accomplished by the breakdown o f the old alliance v1hich
had been formed to defeat Napoleon and the forminc of
alliance between Austria,

Great Britain and France .

a

new

This

new alliance restored France t o the po8ition of equality with
the Four Great Powers in European diplomatic discussions ,

and
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this was Talleyrand ' s primary aim.
In looking at the relative value of Talleyrand and
Castlereagh in the Polish-Saxon settlement ,

both can

be assesoed the position o f mediators s ince neither was
directly involved in the issueo.

Franc e ,

certainly,

had a

greater involvement than England since France could be
directly threatened by a continental war.

The individual

importance of each man can most ea.sily be tmderstood if
each io ass igned a sp�cific function in the settlement .
Castlereagh ' o func tion in the sett lement of Poland
and Saxony,

al though misdirected during the .early months o f

thq Congre s s , was that o f a true compromiser.
was

Cantlereagh

the prime motivator of moderation throughout the Congre ss .

Du.ring the early months he

cen·tered his attempto at moderation

of the intereGts of Austria on her Saxon frontier and Russia
in Poland.

He also attempted to keep France in the background .

In the latter monthr: ,

that led to the final oet tlement , he

moved into a policy of moderating the demand of both Rusnia in
Poland and Prussia in Saxony .

The :problems of modifying the

demands of Prus!lia and Russia were combined with the problems
of sati sfying Austria for the losses she was to encounter on
both her Rus sian o..nd Prus2ian front iers and moderating the
demands of Talleyrand for the restoration of moot of Saxony .
Talleyrand ' s !unction was that of giving the discussions
a finn basi s on which t o operat e .

Talleyrand brought to the
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Congress

a

definite plan for making ·the

settlement .

this basis f·or nettlement the principle of
v�·hether or not his
since

11legit imacy , " but

a cound principle i s of little importance

it did provide the needed direction for

promise .
was

wo.::i

of the discussions ,

but ,

eventual com

Five Great Powers at the Congress .
Congress firm direct ic'l,

Talleyrand

eventually ,

the po£:i tion, which l!"'rance deserved to have ,

as

he assumed

one of the

In addition to giving the

after the failure of Castlereagh ' s

attempts at an early settlement ,
enough ,

�
�

During the early months of the Congre s s ,

on the pale

He called

Talleyrand also was flexible

within the framework of his princ iple,

to permit sufficient

compromise to enable settlement . The compromising spirit of
Talleyrand can best be seen in his agreement that the King of
Saxony not be c onsulted in the settlement of his kingdom ' s fat e ,
which was very ne�rly a contradi ction o f Talleyrru1d 1 s principle .
The French mininter 1 s ability and willir.i.gne s s to compromise can
alGo be readily witnesced when the actual sett lement was made
on .the Saxon question since the

settlement

was

far below his

demands for the restoration of the King and kingdom of Saxony .
The future of Poland and Saxony was settled by the powers
with rather equal aid from both Castlereagh and Talleyrand.
Both individuals were indispensable under the circumstanc es
which existed at Vienna during t!1e time of the Polish-Sro:on
disput e .

Talleyrand interpreted Saxony as the important question,

a.nd it was eventually treated as such.

Castlereagh treated the
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PoliGh question as the mos t impo:ctant one but was willing
t o ben 1 when circurast e..nceo made obvious the re al ity that
r

Saxony had be cone for the c ontinental powers the

issue most

imp ort ant an� most difficult to zettle.
The final settlement of the i s sue s of Poland and
Saxony,

although not s e ttled in necessarily the best

con

c eivable rarumer or in o. · way completely ple asing to the powers
involved ,

v;as ,

et le as t ,

settled sati sfac t orily enough t o

help provide the foundation for the balance of power that was

to prevent Europ e from having another Euro!>ea.n wide war for
a century .

The balanc e of power was to chruige 0ften in the

comine hundred years but the Congre so of Vienna did provide a
firm and yet flexible enough base to prevent another general
explosion.
The :::: e t tlement

of the Poli sh-Saxon quest i on wa:J the

post import ant settlement made at Vienna because without it
the C ongre so could never have been sati sfac torily . concluded .
Talleyrn.ncl ru1.d Castlereagh were the prime figu:res in the

attainment c£ a

s at isfac t ory , but no"t perfect ,

the Poli sh-Saxon i s sue ,

settlement of

and they were both inextri cably

c onne ct ed with making such a se tt leme nt p oo o ible .

Neither of

these men can be credited with nore import ance than the other
in the malcing of the o ettl ement and yet together ,

althouch

perforr!ling quite different functionn and often o.ctinc in
oppos it ion t o each other,
the

sett lement .

they were the prime det erminnntc of'
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A TREATY O�' UNION , CONCERT , AND
SUBSIDY , BETWEEN HIS BRIT�""NIC
MAJESTY AHD HIS IIIAJESTY THE
EMPEROR OF ALL THE RUSSIAS.
SIGNED AT CHAUl''l!ON T ,

1814

THE lST OF' MARCH

In the �rune of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity.
Hin Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of All the RusDias ,
His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Ma jesty the Emperor �f Aus tria,
King of Hungary and Bohemia, and His Majesty the King of
Prussia, having transmitted to the French Government proposals
for concluding a general pence, and be ing desirous , should
France refuse the conditions theroin containe d , to draw closer
the ties which unite them for the vigorous prosecution of a
war undertaken for the salutary purpose of putting an end t o
the miseries o f Europe , o f s ecuring its future repose , by
re-establi shing a just balance of power, and bring at the s&�e
tir.ie desirous, should the Almighty bless their pe,c ific in
tentions, to fix the means of maintaining, against every
attemp t , tho order of things which shall have been '!:he happy
consequence of their effort s , have agre ed to sanc tion, by a
solemn treaty, signed separately by each of the four powero
with the three others , this twofold engagement .
In consequence , His Majesty the King of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has nai:ied to discus s ,
settle , and sign the conditions o f the present Treaty, with
His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, the hight Honourable
Robert St ewart , Viscount Castlereagh, one of His said Majesty ' s
Most Honourable Privy Counc i l , Member of Parliament , Colonel
of the Londonderry Hegiment of Militia, &."ld His Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs , &c . & c . & c . and His
Majesty the Emperor of all the H.ussias , having n.ominate d on
his part , Charles Robert , Count de Nessclrode , h..1.. s PriviJ
Councillor, Secretary of Stat e , Ac tual Chamberlain, Knight
Grand Cross of the Order of S t . Wolodimir of the second class,

Knight of the Order of Leopold of Austria, of the Red Eagle
of Prus sia, of the Polar Star of Sweden, and of the Golden

-79-

Za.gle of Wurtemberg ; the said Plenipotentiaries , after
having exchanged their full powers, found to be in due
and proper form, have agreed upon the foll owing Article s :
ARTICLE I .
The High Contract ing Powers above-named solemnly engage
by the preoent treaty, and in the event of F·rance refusing to
accede to the conditions of peace now proposed , to apply all
the means of their respect ive statP.s to the vigorous pro
secution of the war against that power, and to employ them
in perfect concert , in order to obtain for themselves and for
Europe a general peace , under the pro·tection of which the
rights and liberties of all nations may be e stablished and
secured.
ThiLJ engagement shall in no respect affect the st ipu
lation£ which the several powers have already contracted
relative to the nwnber of troops to be kept against the enemy ;
and it i::.; unders t o o d , that ·the Courts of England , Russia, Austria,
and PrufJ sia, e'tlgage by the present treaty to keep in the f i e l d ,
each o f them, one hundred and fifty thousand effective men,
exclusive of garri sons, to be employed in active service
asninst the common enemy.
ARTICLE I I .
The High Contract ing Part ies reciprocally engage not to
negociute separately with the c ollli�on enemy , nor t o sign peac e ,
They moreover
truc e , nor convention, but with coomon consent .
engage not to lay down their arms until the o b j e c t of the war,
mutually u11d erstoocl anc.1 agreed upon, shall have been attaine d .

ARTICLE I I I .
In order t o contribute in tne most prompt and decis ive
manner t o fulfil this great obje c t , His Britannic Majesty
engage tl t o furnish a subsidy of five millions st erling for
the ser\Tice of the year 1814 to be divided in equal proporti on��
2.lnongst the three powers : and His said Majesty promi oes more
over to arrance , before the 1st of January in each year, with
their Imperial and Royal Majestie s , the further r3ucc ours to be
furni shedc durir..g the oubsequent year, if ( 11.rh ich God forbid ) the
war should zo lone cont inue .
The sub s i dy above st ipulat e d , of
five millions sterling, shall be paid in London, by monthly
inst alment s ,

and in equal pnoportions ,

to the MiniDter,;-; of the

-80-

respective powers duly authorised to receive the same.
In
case peace should be s igned between the Allied Powers and
France before the ex�iration of the year, the subsidy, cal
culated up on the scale of five millions sterling, shall be
paid up to the end of the month in which the definitive treaty
shall have been signe d ; and His Bri·tannio Majesty promise s ,
in addition, to pay t o Rus s i a four months, and t o Austria and
t o Pruosia two months , over and above the stipulated subsidy,
to cover the expences of the return of their troops within
their own front iern.
ARTICLE IV.
The High Contrac ting Part ies will be entitled respect ively
to accredit to the Generals commanding their armie s , Officers,
who will be allowed to correspond with their Government s , for
the purp ooe of informing them of the milit ary events , and of
every thine which relates to the operations of the annie s .
AHTICLE V .
The High Contracting Powers reserving t o themselves to
concert together, on the conclusion of a peace with Franc e ,
as to the means best adapted to guarantee t o Europe and t o thew
selves reciprocally the continuance of the Peace , have also
dete rmined to enter, without delay, into de fensive engagements
for the protection of their respective states in Europe againut
every att empt which France might make to j nf'ringe the order of
things result ing from such pacification,
ARTICLE vr.
�· o effect this they agree , that in the event of one of
the High Contract ing Part ies being threatened with an attack
on the part of France , the others shall employ their most
Gt renuouz efforts to prevent i t , by friendly interposition.
ARTICLE VII .
In the case of these endeavours proving ineffe ctual ,
the Hieh Contracting part i e s promise to come to the immediate
assistance of the power attacke.i , each with a body of sixty
thousand men.
ART ICLE V I I I .
Such auxiliary c o rps shall re3pect ively consist o f fifty
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thousand infc.ntry and ten thousand c aval ry, with a train
of a�tillery, and l'..11l!llunit ion in proportion to the number of
tr�>aps : the auxiliary c o rp s shall be ready to take the field
in th e most effect ive manner, for the safety of the power
attacked or threatened , within two montho at latest after the
re quis ition shall have been made .
ARTICI& IX.
As 1;he situation of the neat of war, or other circv..m
ntances, might render i t difficult for Great Britain to
furnish the s tipulat ed succours in Engli sh troopo within the
term pre s cribe d , and to maintain the same on a war establinh
ment , His Britanni c :&ia j esty re s erve s the right o:t' furnishing
his cont ingent to the requiring power in foreign troops in hie
pay , or to pay annually to that power a ::;uin of money , at the
rate of twenty pounds sterling p er each ua.n for infantry , c.nd
of' thirty pounds sterling for cavalry , until the stipulated
succour shall be compl e t e .
The mode of furni shing this succour by Gre at Britain
s:h.all be settled c.raicably, in each particular case , betv1een
His Britanni c Majesty and the power threatened or attacked ,
�e p rinc ip le
as soon as the requisition shall be made : the sa
shall be adopted vd th regard t o the forces whi ch Hin Britannic
Ma j e s ty engages to furnish by the first article of the p re n ent
treaty .
AR�1 ICLE X �

auxiliary army shall be under the orders of tLe
CortL."!ln..nder in Chief of' thf-\ army of the requiring power; it s!:e.11
be commanded by i to own Genersl , n.n.<1 employed in a.11 milit<:...J:/
':rhc p[.;�y oi.' the
op e rati on:: acc ord ing to the rules of war.
auxili2.ry army uh.all be defray ed by the requi rint; porter; the
rations and portions of provisions und fo rage , &c . as well ac
quarters , shall be furnished by the requirinG powe r ac noon
as the auxiliary army shall have passed i tc ovvn frontier; and.
tha.t upon the same fo o t ing as the said power maintains , or
shall maintain , its O\ivn tro op s in the field or in que..r tern.
The

ARTICL"S �-�I

Tho diGcipline anC.
s olely depend upon their
eeparE>.te d .
The trophi e s
belong t o the t ro opc who

c..cl:ninii..;i;:.cc.tion of t�1c troops shall
own co!illn::mder ; "they shall not be
and booty taken from the enemy Ghall

tol\:e them.
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ARTICLE XII.
Whenever the amount of the stipulated succours ah.all
be found inadequate to the exigency of the case, the High
Contracting Parties reserve to themselves "';o make , without
lose of time, an ulterior arrangement as to the additional
ouccours ·which it may b e deemed necesSal"'J to furnish .
ARTICLE XII I .
The High Contrnctin-g Parties mutually promis e , that in
caoe they shall be reciprocally engaged in hostilit ie::z, in
consequence of furnishing the stipulated succours , the party
requiring and the parties called upon, and acting as auxiliaries
in the we.r , shall not make peace but by common consent .
ARTICLE XIV.
The eng_agements c ontractod by the pre :::; ent Treaty , shall
not prejudice those which the High C ontracting Part i es may
hn.ve entered into with other power�, nor prevent them from
f o rming new engageraents •t.ri th other states, with a view of obtain,....
ing the same salutary result .

ARTICLE

X:V .

In order to render �ore effectual the defensive eng<J.ge
ments above stipulated , by uniting for their common defence
the powern the most exposed to a Prench invasion, the Hieh
C ontracting Parties engage to invite those powers to accede to
the present Troaty of defensive allianc e .
AHTICLE XVI .
The pre£ent Treaty o f d3fensive alliance havine for itc
object to maintain the equilibrium of Europe , to secure the
repone and independa..�ce of itG states, ?..nd to prevent the
invaGions which during so many yearn have desolated the world ,
the Hit;h C ontracting Parties have Q.greed t o extend the duration
of it to twenty years , t o take date from the day of its s ignature ;
and they reserve to themselveG , to concert upon itD ulterior
prolongation, three yearn before itn expiration, should �ir
cumctances require it .
f_:UTICLE XVII .
The present Treaty Dha.11 be ratified, and the ratification
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exchanged within two months or sooner if possible .
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries
have aigned the same , and affixed thereto the seal of their
ams .

first of March,
Done at Chaumont this seventeenth of February , in the
year of our Lord one thousand e ight hundred and fourteen.
( Signed)
CASTLEREAGH .
( L. S . )

( Signe d )
CHARLES ROBERT t
COMTE DE NESSELRODE.
(L. S . )
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Al?PENDL"{ I I
DEFINIT IVE TREATY OF PE.AC:Z AND AMITY
BETWEEN HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY AND H I S
MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY

SIGNED AT PARIS , THE 30TH DAY Oli' MAY 1814.

In the Name of the I�ost Holy and Undivided Trinity.
His 1\lajesty, the King of the Uni t e d Kingdom of Great Brita.in
and Ireland , and Hi s Allies on the one part , and His J\ia j e G ty
the King of Franc e and of Navarre on the other part , animat e d
by an equal desire t o t e rminate the long agitations of :r�uror � ,
and the sufferings of mankind , by a permanent p e ac e ,
founded upon a ju s t repartition o f force be tween i t s States
and c ont aining in its s t ipulations the pledge of its durability;
and His Bri t EUUli c f4ajeety, t o�e ther with his Allies, be ing un
will ing to re qui re o f F1ranc e , nO\J that , replaced under the
pate rnal gove rnment of her King:::; , she offers the assurance of
se curity and stabili+.y to Europe , the conditi onc and guarru1t ees
which th ey had with regret demanded from her former G overnment ,
their saio. Majesties have named Plenipo t ent i ari e o to di3cuss,
nettle , and sign a Treaty of Peace and &'ni-ty ; namely ,
His Majesty the King of the United Kinr;dom of Great
Britain a...
11d Ireland , the Right Eonourable Hobert 3 t e'li;art ,
Visc ount Castlereagh, one of His said Majesty ' s Most Honourable
Privy C ounc i l , Member of Parliament, Colonel of the London
derry Regiment of rllili t i a , and Hi::> Princ ip al S ecre tary oi'
State for Foreign Affai rs , &c . & c . d:c . ; the Rit;ht I-1 01·.i.our2.ble
Ge orge Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, V i s c ount li"o rmart ine j Lord
Haddo , l\Ietl1lic , Tarvi s , and Kelli e , .��c . one of tha Sixteen
Peers re pre senting the Peerage of Scotland in the Houne of
Lord s , Knight of His Majesty ' s Most Anc i ent and i1Iost Noble
Order of the Thistle, His As�bassador Extraordinary antl Pleni
potentiary t o His Imperial and tloyal Apostolic Hfa j e s ty : the
Right Honourable William Shaw vathcart , Visc ount Cathc art ,
Baron Cathcart and Greeno c k , one of llis M'aJ e s ty ' B r-,10::-:;t Honour
able Privy C ounc i l , Knight of His Order of the Thistle , and
of the Orders of Rurrnia, General in His Majesty ' s Ar.ny , and
His Ambassador Extraordinary and Pl en ip o t ent i ary to His Ma j c i::ty
the Emperor of all the Rus s i e.s ; and the Honourable Sir Gha.rle8
\V illial'l 8tewart , Knight of His l\-la j e s t y ' s Mc st Honourable Order
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of the Bath, Memb e r of Parliament , Lieut enant-General in
His Majesty ' s Army , Knight of the Prussian Orders of the
Black and Red Eagle , and o f s everal others, and his Envoy
Extraord inary and Minister Plenipotentiary t o His Majesty
the King of Prus s i a ; and Bis Maj e s ty the King of F'ra.nce and
Navarre , Charles Mauri c e de Talleyrand Perigord , Prince of
Benevent , Gre�t Eagle of the Legion of Honour, Knight of the
Black and Red Eagle of Prus s i a , Grand Cross of the Order
of Leopold of Austria, Knight of the Russian Order of St .
Andrew, and His said Majesty ' s Minister and Secretary of
State for Foreign Affai rs ; who , having exchanged their full
Powers , found in good and due form, have agreed upon the
foll owing Artieles :
ARTICLE I .

There shall be from this day forward perpetual peace
and friendship between HiB Britannic J;lajesty and His Allies
on the one part , and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre
on the other,' their h ei rs and suc c e s sors , their dominions and
sub j ects , respectively.
The high contract ing parti e s · .shall devote their best
attention t o maintain. not only between Themselve s , but , in
asmuch as depends up0n them, between all the states of J.t..
urope ,
that harmony and good understanding which are so necessary for
their tranqui l l i t y .
ARTICLE I I .
The kingdom of Frr-.in ce retains i t s limits ent ire , as
It shall further
they existed on the 1st of J'a:nuary , 1792 .
receive the increase of Terri t o ry comprised within the line
established by the foll owing Article :
ARTICLE I I I .

On the side o f Belgium, Germany and I t aly , the ancient
front iers shall be re-established as they e xi s te d the 1st of'
January 1792 , extending from the I�ort:':-1 Sea, between Dur..kirk
and Nieuport, t o the :Wfedi terrar1ean between Cagne£ and Nice
with the foll owing modifications :
1st.
In the department of Jemapp e s , the Cantons of
Dour, Merbes-le-Chateau, Beaumont , and Chimay shall belong to
Franc e , where the line of demarkat ion comes in c on tact with
the Canton of Dour, it shall pass between that Canton and thone
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of Boussu and Pature.ge , and lilcewise further on it shall :pass
between the Canton of P.� erbe s-le-Chateau, and ·those of Binck
and Thuin.
2.
In the Department of Sambre and Meus e , the C antons
of Walcourt , Florenne s , B eauraing , and Gedinne , shall belong
t o France ; where the dern.arkation rea.�hes th.at department , it
shall follow the line which s eparate s the said Cantons from the
department of Jernappes , and f'rom the remaining Cru1tons of the
department of Sam.bre and Meus e .
3.
In the department o f the P,losell e , the new demarkation,
at the point where it diverges from the old line of frontier,
shall be formed by a line to be drawn from Perle to Fremersdorff,
and by the limit which separate s the Canton of Tholey from the
remaining Cantons of the said de.partmen-t of the Moselle .
In the department of La Sarre t the Cantons of Saar
4.
bruck and Arneval shall continue to belong t o France , ao like
wise the portion of the C ant on of Lebach which io situated t o
the South o f a line dravm along the confines o f t he village$ o:f
Herchenbach, Ueberhofen, Hilsbach and Hall ( l e aving these
different places out of the French frontier) to the point
where , in the neighbourhood of Querselle ( whi ch place belongs to
France ) the line which separate s the Cantons of Arneval a.nd.
Ottweiler reaches that which separates the Cantons of Arneval
and Le bach .. The frontier on this side shall be formed by the
line above de scribed , and a.f tc:nvards by that ·which separates
the Canton of Arneval frora that of Bliescustel.
The fortre ss of Landau having before the year 1 7 9 2 ,
5.
formed an insulated point in Germany , France retains beyond
her front i ers a port i on of the departments of· ·iiiount Tonnerre
and of the Lower Rhine , for the purpose of uniting the said
fortress and i ts radius to the rent of the kingdom.
The new demarkation from the point in the neighbourhood
of Obersteinbach (which place is left out of' the limits of
]'ranee ) where the boundary between the depart�nent of the
Moselle , and that of Mount Tonnerrc reaches the department
of the Lower Rhine , shall follow the line wi'li c h separates the
Cantons of Weissenbourg and Bergzabe:rT1 ( on the side of France )
from the Cantons of PermaBens Dahn , and .l\.nn.weiler (on the side
of Germany ) as far as the point near the v il l s&e of Voll
mersheim where that line touches the a...11tien·c; radius of the
]\rom this rad iuz \i'hich rE.:main:3 as it
fortress of Landau.
was in 1792 the new frontier shall follow the arm of the river
de la Queioh, which on leaving the said radius at Queichheim
( that place remaining to France ) flows near the villages of
Merlenheim, K..."'li ttelsheim and Belheim ( these places also be1ont:�:
ing to France ) to the Rl1ine which from thence shall continue to
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form the boundary of France and Germuny .
The main stream (Thalweg) of the Rhine shall constitute
the frontier; provided, however, that the changes which may
hereafter ta.lee place in the course of that river shall not
affect the property of' the Island s . 1rhe right of possession in
these Islands shall be re-established as it existed at t!le
sir,nature of the Treaty of Luneville .
6.
In the d e1Jart ment of the Doub s the frontier ehall
be so regulated as to conunence above the Rancormiere tJ.ec.r
Locle and follow the Crest of Jura between the Cerneux,
Pequienot end the villuge of F'ontenelles , aG far as the pealc
of that J/lountain situat ed about seven or eight thousand fe e t
to the North-west of the village of La Brevine , where it shall
agai n fall in with the antient boundary of France .
In the department of the Leman , the frontiers between
7.
the French territory, the Pays de Vuud and the different portions
of the territory of the Hepu'blic o f Geneva (which is to form pa.rt
of Swis:;:; erland ) remain as they were before the incorporation
of Geneva with Franc e . But the Cantons of Frari..sy and o f 3t .
Julien (with ,the exception of the districts situated to tLe
north of a line drawn from the point v:here the river of La
Laire enters the territory of Geneva near Chancy fo ll owing
the confines of Sesequin, Laconex end �eseneuve , which shall
remain out of the limits of �,ranee ) the Cunt on o f Rcignier,
with the exception of the portion to the east of � line which
follows the confines of the Muraz Bus�y
Pers , and Cornier,
which shall be out of the French limits � and the C::;nton of JJG.
Roche (with the exception. of the plac es called La Hoche , cmcl
Armar1vy with their dintrictf.: ) shall re21ain to Franc e . The
frontiar shall fo ll ow the limits of these different 03.ntons .
and the iine which separates the diotricts cont inuinc t o
belong to France , from those which :3he does not retain.
In the Department of Montblanc , Fro.nee acquirec the ·..:ub
Prefectnre of Chambery, with the exception of tl:.e Canton� of
L � Hopital, St . Pierre d ' Albigny, La Rocette, a."1.d 1'for.:.tmelian,
anc.i th€! nub-Prefecture of Annecy, with the exception or
: the
portion of the Canton of Faverges , i:;i tuated to the east of G.
line passing between Ou:rechaise and narlens on the �' ic.10 of
France , and �darthod and Ugine on the oppoai te side , and which
afterwards follows the crest of the rnountc::.ins ac far o..G the
frontier of the Canton of Thone s ; this line , together with
the limit of the cantons before mentioned, shall on this f.� ide
form the new frontier.
On the side of the Pyreneee , tha frontiers l>etween tl:.e
two kingdoms of Franc e and Spain, remnin ouch as thoy were
the l::: t of January , 1792 , and a j oint Commission Dhull be

-88-�

named on the part of the two Crowns for the purpose of
finally d e t e rmining the

line .

France on her part renounces all rights of Sovereignty,
Suzerainet e , and of p o s s e ss ion over all the countries,
districts , towns and places situated beyond the frontier
above described, the Principality of Monaco being replaced
·on the zame footing on which it stood before the 1st of
January , 1792 .
The Allied Powe rs as sure to Frs.nce the possession
of the Principality of .Avignon, of the Comtat Venai s s in ,
of the C omt e o f Jilontbeilli ard , together wi th the several
insulat e d territ-ories which formerly belonged to Germany,
comprehended within ·the frontier above described, whether
they have been incorporated \'ii th France before or after the
The Powers reserve to themselve s ,
lst of January , 1792 .
reciprocally , the complete right t o fortify any point in
their respective states which they may judge necessary for
their se curity .
To prevent all in jury t o private property, and protect ,
according to the most liberal principles, the property of
individuals domiciliated on the frontiers , there shall be
named , by each of the states bo rd ering on Franc e , C ommissioners,
who shall proceed, con j o intly with French Commissioners , to
the d elineat ion of the respective boundari e s .
As soon as the Commissioners shall have perfori-�ed their
task, maps shall be dravm, signe d by t he respective Com
missi one rs , and p ost s shall be placed t o point out the re
ciprocal boundarie s .
ARTICLE IV .
To secure the communi cat i ons o f the t own of Geneva with
o t he r parts of the Swiss territory situated on the lake ,
France consents that the road by Versoy shall be COi11'1lOl'1 t o
the two c ountries.
The respective Gove.n1.ments shall ruaicably
arrange the means for prevent ing smuggling, regulating the
post s , and maintaining the said road.
ARTICLE V .
The navigation o f the Rhine , from the point v1here it
becomes navigable unto the s e a , �..nd vi c e versa, shall be fre e ,
s o that i t can be interdicted t o no one : and at t he future
Congres n , attention shall be paid to the establish.,'llent of' the
principles according to wh i ch the duties to be raioed by the
States borde ring-· on the Rhine may be regulat ed, in the mode the
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i;:-.upa.rt i al , :llld the most favourable to the commerce of
ull nat i ons .
The future Congres s , with a view t o facilitate the
corni�unication ·between nations, and c ont inually to render
them le ss strangers to each other, shall likewise exrunine
und tletermine in what mar...ne r the ubov& provision con be
e xt e nd ed to other Hivers which, in their navigable course ,
s0parate or t rave rs e different States .

moot

AHTICLE VI.
Holland, placed under the Sovereigr,.ty of the House o f
Orange , shall re c e ive an increa�.ie of t e rri to ry
The title
and exercise of that Sovereignty shall not in any case belong
to a Princ e wearing or destined to we ar a f o re ign Crown.
The States of Germany shall be independent and united
.

by a federative bond .
Switzerland , independent ,

Hert3elf.

shall

cont inue t o govern

Italy , beyond the lirnitE; of tl.:.e countri es which are to
reve rt to Austria, shall be composed of Sovereign Stat e s .
ARTICLE VII .
The Island of IYialta and it3 Dependencies shall belong
right and Sove re ignt y t o His Britanni c Ma j e s t y .

in full

ARTICLE VIII .

His Brit anni c Majesty, stipulating for Him.s e lf and His
All i e s , engages to re store to Hii::: lltioct Christ ian Maj e sty
within the term v1hich shall be hereafter fixed , the colonies ,
f i ohe ri a s , factories and establishments of every kind wh i c h
wGre p oss es s e d by France on the 1st of January 1792 , in the
Seas and on the Continents of Ame rica, Afri c a, and. Arda, with
the exception however of the Islands of Tobago and St . Luc i e
and of the Isle of Franc e and its Dependenci e s , especially
Rodrigues and Les Se che lles , which several Colonien and
Po s se ss ions His Most Christian l.lajesty c e de s in full right and
S overe ignty to His Bri t anni c J.li1aje:Jty, and alno the port ion. of
St . Domingo ceded to France by the T re aty of Easle , and which
His Moot Christian Majesty restores in full right and Sovereignty
to His Cathol i c Majesty.
,

ARTICLE IX.
His Idajesty the

King of

Sweden and

Norway ,

in virtue o f
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the Arrnngements stipulated with the Allie s , and in execution
of the pre c eding Arti c l e , consents that the Island of Guada
loupe be restored to His Most Christian Majesty, and give s up
all the rights He may have acquired over that Island .
ARTICLE X.
Her fflost Fai thf'ul Majesty i n virtue of the Arrangements
stipulat ed with Her Allies and in execution of the 8th Art i cle ,
engagee t o restore French Guyana as i t existed on the 1st of
January 1792 , t o His Most Christ ian Ma j e sty , within the t e rm
hereafter fixed .
The renewal of the dispute which existed at tha:· period
on the sub j e c t of the frontier, b e ing the effect of thin stip
ulation, i t i o agre ed that that di spute shall be terminated by
a fri endly Arrangement between the two Court s , under the
mediation of His Britannic Majesty.
ARTICLE XI .

The places and fo rt s in those Colonies and Settlement s ,
whi ch, by virtue of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Article s , are t o
be restored t o H i s Most Christian Maj esty, shall b e given up in
the state in which they may be at the moment of the signature
of the p re sent Treaty.
ARTICLE . ' X I I .
H i s Brit anni c Ma j e s ty f,l'Uarantees t o the Sub j e c t s of H i s
Most Christian I<f!a jesty the same fac ili t i e s , privi lege s , and
:p rot e c t i on, wi th re sp e c t to c mmnerc e , nnd the security of their
p e r3 ono and property within the limits of the British Soverei£,nty
on the Cont inE'-it of Indi a , as are now or shall be granted t o the
most favoured Nations .
His Most Christian Majesty, on .His part , having nothing
more at heart than the per�etual duration of Peace between
the
Two Crovms of England and of Franc e , and wishing t o do His utmost
to avoid any thing which might affect Their mutual good under
standing , engages not t o erect any fortificationn in the esto..blish
ment s which are to be restored to Nim within the limits of the
British S ove re ignty upon the Continent of India, and only t o
place in tho s e establi shment s the number of troops necessary
for the maintenance of the Police.
ARTICLE XI I I .
The F'rench right o f fishery upon the Great B ank of
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N0v.1foundland, upon the coaots of the Island of that name , and
of the adj acent Islands in the Gulf of St i. Lawrence , shall be
replaced Ul)On the footing in which it stood in 1792 • .
ARTICLE XIV.
Thoce coloni e s , factories , and e stablis.h.ments , which are
to be restored to His Most Christian Majesty by His Britannic
Majeoty or His Allies in the Northern Seas , or in the seas on
the Continents of America and Af'rica, shall be given up within
the three months ; and those which are beyond the Cape of Good
Hope within the six months which follow the ratification of
the present Treaty.
ARTICLE XV .
The High Contracting Parties having , by the 4th Article
of the Convention of the 23rd of April last, reserved to them
selves the r�ght of disposing, in the present Definitive
Treaty of Peace , of the arsenals and ships of war, armed and
tll1armed, which may be found in the maritime places restored
by the 2d Article of the said Convention; it is agree d , that
the :::. aid vessels and··· ships o f war, armed and unarme d , together
with the naval ordnance and naval store s , and all :materials
for building and equipment shall be divided between France
and the countries where the said places are situat e d , in the
proportion of two-thirds for France , and one-third for the
Fower to whom the said places shall belong .
The shipG and
ve�sels on the ' stock�• which shall not be launched ·within ::>ix
weeks after the signature of the present Tre a � y , shall be
considered as materials , and after being broken up shall be ,
as such, divided in the same proportions.
C ommissioners shall be named on both sides to settle the
division 2..nd draw up a statement of the same , and passports or
safe conducts shall be granted by the Allied Powers for the
purpose of securing the return into France of the workmen,
sec.men and others in the employment of France .
The vessels an.d arsenals ex;isting in the maritime places
which were already in the power of the Allies before the 23d
April , and the vessels and arsenals which belonged to Holland ,
and especially the fleet in the Texel, are n0t comprized in the
above stipulations.
The French Government engages to withdraw, or to cause
to be sold evecy thing which shall belong t o it by the above
stipulations within the space of three months after the di vi:.:.:ion
shall have been carried into effec t .
Antwerp shall for tne future be solely a co1amercial port.
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ARTICLE XV I .
The High Contrac ting Part i e s , desirous t o bury in
entire oblivion the dissensions which have agitated Europe,
dec lare and prornise that no individual , o f whatever rank or
condition he may be , in the countries restored and ceded by
the present Treaty, shall be prosecuted, disturbed or molested,
in his person or property, under a:ny pretext what soever,
either on account of his conduct or political opinions , his
attachment either to any of the Contracting Part i e s , o r t o
al1y Government which has c ee.u ed t o exist , o r for any other
reason, excep·� for debts contracted t owards individual s , or
actn
po3terior to the date of the present Treaty .
ARTICLE XVI I .
The native inhabi tants and aliens , o f what ever nation
or condit�on they may be , in those countrieu which are t o
change Sovere igns , a s well in virtue o f the present Treaty as
of the subsequent arrangements to v1hich it may give ri s e , shall
be allowed a period of six years , reckoning:. ·frorn the exchange
of the rat ifications, for the purpose o f dispos ing of their
property, if they think f i t , whether i t be acquired before or
C..uring the present war; and retiring to whatever country they
may cho o s e .
ARTICLE XVI I I .
The Allied Powers , desiring t o offer His Most Christian
majesty a new proof of their anxiety to arre s t , as far as in
them l ie s , the bad cons'?.quence!i of the disastrous epoch
fortunately terminated by the present Peac e , renounce all
the suias which their Governments claim from }'rane e , whether
on account of contrac t � , suppl i e � , or any other advances
whatsoever to the :F'rench Government , during the different war;;:;
which have taken place since 1792.
His Most Christian Majesty, on hi;:; part , renounces every
claim which He might bring fo:nvnrd against the Allied Power.s
In execution o f this �.rticle , the High
on the same grounds .
Contracting Parties engage reciprocally to deliver up all
t i tles , obligations , and document c , which relate t o the debts
They may have mutually cancelled .
ARTICLE XIX .
The l1'rench Government eneagen t o liquidate and pay o.11
debts it may be found t o owe in countries beyond i t G ovrr1
territory, on account of contrac t � , or other formal engage
ments between individuals , or private e stabli shment s , and the
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French Authorities, as we ll for suppli e s , as in satisfaction
of legal eng�ements .
ARTICLE XX .
The High Contracting Part i e s , immediately after the
exchange of the Ratifications of the present Tre aty , shall
name Commisf:: ioners to direct and superintend the execution
of t he whole of the st ipulat ions contained in the 18th and
19th Art i cl e s . These Corru!1i s s i oneru shall undertal�e the
e xamina t i on of the claims refe rred to in the pre c e ding Art i cl e s ,
the l i qui dation of the sumo claimed , and the consideration of
the manner in which the F'rench Government muy propose to pay
�'hey Ghall alsc be charged with the deli very of the
them.
titles , bond s , and the documentt> relating to the debts which
the High Contracting Parties mutually cancel , so that the
approval of the result of their labours , shall complete that
re c iprocal renunciation.

ARTICLE XXI .
The debts which in their origin were specially mort
gaged upon the countries no longer belonging to Franc e , or
were contracted for the suppo rt of their internal administration,
shall re:nuin at the charge of the said countri e s . Such o f those
debts as have been converted into inocriptions in the great
bool{ of the public debt of F'rance , shall accordingly be account
e d for with the French Government after the 22d of December 181 3 .
The deeds of all· those debts which have been prepared
for imJcription, and have rwt yet been entered, shall be
deliverea. to the Governments of the respective courrr.ries .
The s t atement of all these debts shall be drawn up and settlefi
by a j oint corrunission.
ARTICLE XX I I .
Government shall remain charged with the
reimbursement of all sums paid by the :::;u bjects of the said
countries into the French coffers, whether under the de
nomination of surety, deposit, or consignment .
In like manne r all French sub j ect s , employed in the service
of the said countrie s , who have paid sums ur1der the denominatlon
of zurety , deposit , or consign:nent , into their respective terri
t o ri e ;:; , shall be faithfully reimbursed..
The French

AeTICLE XXI I I .
The Functionaries holding situations requiring securiti e s ,
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who are not charged with the expendi ture of public money
shall be reimbursed at Pari s , wi ·th the interes t , by fifths
and by the year, dating from the signature of the present
With respect to those who are acc ountable , this
T::-eaty.
reimbursement shall commence , at the lat e s t , six months
after the presentation of their acc ount s , except only in
A copy o f the last account shall be
cases of malversat ion.
transmi tted to the Government o f their countri e s , t o serve
:for their information and guidanc e .
ARTICLE Y
...XIV.
The judicial deposits and cons ignments upon the
"caisse d ' amortissement " in the execution of the law of
28 Nivose , year 13 (15 January , 1805 , ) and. which belong
:t1o the inhabitants of the c ountries France ceases to posse s s ,
shal l , within the space o f one year from the exchange of the
Ratifications of the present ��reat:y , be placed in the hands o:f
the Authoriti�s of the said countri e s , with the exception of
those deposits and cons ignments interest ing French subj e c t s ,
which last will remain in the 11 caisse d ' amortiss ement . 11
and will only be given up on the production of the vouchers ,
result ing from the decis ions of competent authorities.
ARTICLE XX.V.
The funds deposited by the c orp orations and public
establi shments in the "Caisse d e service ttand in the ''Caisse
d ' amort i s sement , " o r other "cirs s e , 11 of the F'rench Govern
ment , shall be reimbursed by fifths, payable from year to
year, t o commence from the date o f the present Treaty ;
deduct ing the advances which have taken plac e , and sub j e c t
t o such regular charges as may have been brought forward
against these funds- by the creditors of the said corporations,
and the said public establi shment s .
ARTICLE ll7V I .
From the first day o f January 1814 , the French Govern
ment shall cease to be charged with the payment of pension s ,
c j vi l � military and eccle siastical ; pensions for retirement ,
a.'1.d m.llowance s f0r reduction, to any individual who shall
cease t o be a French sub j e c t .

Nati onal domains acquired for valuable considerati ons by
French sub j ec t s in the late departments o f Belgium, and of the
left bank of the Rhine , and the Alps beyond the antient limits
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of Frai.'1c e , and which now cease t o belong to Her,
guarant eed to the purchasers.

shall be

ARTICLE XXV I I I .
The a.bolition of the " droits d ' Aubaine , 0 de "Detraction , "
and other dut ies of the same nature , in the countrie s which
have reciprocally made that stipulation with Franc e , or which
have been formerly incorporat e d , shall be expressly maintaine d .
ARrICLE XXIX.
The French Gove rnment engages to restore all bonds, and
other deeds which may have been seized in the provinces occupied
by the French armi e s or administrations ; and in cases where
such restitution cannot be effected, these bonds and deeds
bec ome and cont inue void .
ARTICLE XXX .
The sums which shall be due for all works of public
utility not ye t finishe d , or finished after the 31st of
December 1812, whether on t�1e Hhine or in the departments
detached from France by the preoent Treaty , shall be placed
to the acc oun� of the future possessors of the territory,
and shall be paid by the com.11i csion charged with the liquidation
of the debts of that country.
ARTICLE XXXI .

All archive s , map s , plans and docu..rnents what ever,
bel onging to the ceded count r i e s , or respecting their
adminiztration, shall be faithfully given up at the came time
with the scid countries : or if that should be impo ssible ,
'Ni thin a period not exceeding six months after the ces3ion of
the count ries themselve s .
This st ipulation applies to the archive s , map s and
plate s , which may have been carried away from the countries
during their temporary oc cupat ion by the di fferent armie s .
ARTICLE XXX:I I .
All the powers engaged on either side in the preoent
war, shall , within the space of two months , send Plenipoten
ti::i.rieo to Vienna, for the purpose of regulating in general
Congres s , the arrangements which are to complete the provisions
of the present Treaty.
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ARTICLE XXXI I I .
The present Treaty shall be ratifi ed , and the r atifi cat i ons
shall be exch2.nged wi thin the period of fifteen day s , or sooner
if p o s s ible
In witness where o f the respective Plenipotentiaries have
s igned and affixed t o i t the seals o f their arms .
Done at Pari n the thirtieth of May , in the year of our
Lord one Thousand eight Hundred and fourt een.

.

( L. S . )

(

)
(L . S . )
( L. G . )
'""
T .0
.1.1
.

CASTLEiil�AGR.

(L. S . )

CAl'HCART .
CHARLES STEWART ,

Ll�

PRINCE DE
BENEVENT •

Lieut . -Gen.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES
ARTICLE I .
His I/Io�t Christian Ma j e sty , concurring vli thout re se rve
in the sentiment s of His Bri t annic maj esty, with respect to a
de s c rip t i on of t raffi c repugna.."'lt to the principl e s of natural
jus t ic e and of the enli ght ene d. age in which we live , engages
t o unite all His efforts t o tho se of His Britannic Maj e s t y ,
at the appro aching Congre s s , to induc e all the Powers of
Chri st endom to decree the abolition o:f the Slave Trade , GO that
the said Trade shall cease universally, as i t shall c e au e
defin5.t ively , under any c i rcumstanc e s , o n the part of the
F'rench Gove rnment , in the c ourse of five years ; and that ,
during the said period, no slave merchant shall import o r
sell sluvef.l , exc ept i n the Colonies of the 3tate of v;hich he
is a sub j e c t .
ARTICLE I I .
The British and French GoverrnaentB shall na"Ue , without
delay , Cornnissioners to liquidate the accountn of their ::c0cpecti ve expences for the maint enanc e of pri �rnners of war; in
order to determine the manner of paying the balance which shall
appe ar il� favour o f the one or the o the r of the two Po•Nerr;

..

•

.AR'.I.' ICLE I I I .
The respective pri soners o f v1ar, bef o re their departure
place of their det enti on , shall be obliged t o dischurge
they may have contrac ted, or shall at least
the p rivate debts
give sufficient security for the amount .
from the
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Immediately after the Rutification of the present
Treaty of Peac e , the �equeoters which since the year 1792
( one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two ) may have been
laid on the funds , revenues , debt s , or any other effects
of the High Contracting Part ies or their sub j ec t s , shall
be tnken off.
The commissioners mentioned in the 2d art icle shall
undertake the examination of the claims of .His Britannic
Ma jesty ' s subjects upon the French Government , for the
value of the property , moveable or i!Illlo
l veable , illegally
confiscated by the French Authori t i e s , as aloo for the total
or partial loss of their debts or other property , illegally
detained under sequester since the year 1792, (one thousand
seven hundred and ninety-two ) .
:F'rance engages t o act t owards Dri tish sub j e c t s in
this resp e c t , in the same spirit of justice which the liirench
sub j e cts have experienced in Great Britain; and His Britannic
Majesty, des:i.ring to c oncur in the new pledge which the Allied
Powers have given to His I'iio st Christian Majesty, of Their
desire to obliterate every trace of that disastrous epocha
so happily terminate d by the present peac e , engages on His
part , when complete justice shall be rendered to His sub j ects ,
t o renounce the whole a.mount of the be.lance which shall.
appear in His favour for su11port of the prisoners of w ar , so
that til.e r·atification of the report of the above c ommissioners ,
and the discharge of the sums due to British Sub j e c t s , as well
as the restitution of the effects which shall be proved t o
belong to them, shall complete the renunciation.
AH�ICLE V .
'l'he two High Contract ine Part i e s , desiring t o establish
the most friendly relations between Their respective sub j ects ,
reserve t o Themselves, and promise t o come to a 1nutual under
standing and arrangement , as soon as possible, upon Their
commercial interest s , with the view of encouraging and in
creasing the prosperity of Their respective Stat e � .
The present Addi t i onal Articles shall have the same
force and validity as if they were inserted word for word in
the Treaty Patent of this day .
They shall be ratified, and the
ratifi�ations shall be exchanged at the same t ime .
In witness whereo f , the respective plenipotentiaries have
signed and affixed to them the seals of their armn .
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Done at Par i o , the thirtieth day of May , in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hu11dred
and fourt een.

( L . S. )
( L. S. )
( L. S . )
( L. :3 . )

CASTLEREAGH.
ABEHD.EEN .
CATHCART .
CHARLES 3TEWART ,

(L.S. }
Lieut . -Gen.

LE PRINCE DE
.J3ENEVENT .
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II
APPENDIX I
CITtClJLAR OF PRINCE REPNIN
"A letter of the Mini s t e r , Baron von Stein, dated
October 21 , has informed me of a convent ion concluded
Sept ember 28 at V i e1ma , by virtue of which his Wlajesty
the E�np eror o f Russia, in concert with England and
Auntria will put the aclmini G tration o f the kingdom o f
3e.xony into the hand::> of the King o f Prussia.
I run
ordered to hand over the covernment of this c ountry
t o the representativee. of his Hia j e sty the King of Prus s i a ,
and t o replace the imperial Hussian troops by those o f
Prus s i a , in order t o effect the union of Saxony and Prus s i a ,
which will shortly take place in a more fo rmal and solernn
manner, and t o establish a c l o s e r fraternity between the
two nations. � After the preliminary deliberations, o f
which the aim i s the well-beine; o f the two part i e s , their
Majesti es have de clared the following :
King Frederick
\\'illiam, in his quality of future sovere ign of the country,
has declared that he will not incorporate Saxony as a
province of his stat e s , bu·!; will uni t e it t o Prus s i a
under the title of the kingdom o f Saxony , will preserve i t
always i n its integri ty , will leave it the enj oyment o f
i t s right s , privilege s , and advantages which the con
s t i tution of' Germariy will preserve for those partc; of
Germany which form part of' the Prus sian m.onarchy • and
s o far vlill change · nothing o f i t s actual constitution.
_i\nd his Majesty the Emperor Alexander has witnessed the
Spec ial satisfaction he feels on acc ount of this declaration . "
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APPENDIX IV

SECRET TREATY OF DEFENSIVE ALLIA.!'lCE
CONCLUDED AT VIENNA, JANUARY 3RD, 181 5 �
BETVIE.EN AUSTRIA, FHA.NOE, AND GREAT BRITAIN .
In the name of the Most Holy and indivisible Trinity.
His Majesty the King of the Uni ted Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland , His Ma jesty the King of France and
Navarre , and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of
Hungnry and Bohemia, be ing convinced that the Powers , t o
whose share i t falls to complete the provisions of the
tro : . t;y of Pari s , ought to be in a position of perfect
s e 0·tn·i ty and independence , in order to be able to acquit
themselves with the fidelity and dignity requisite to so
important a duty, and oonsequently, considering i t necessary,
in face of pretensions recently put forth, to provide means
of repulsing any aggre s s ion to which their ovm possessions,
or those of one of their number might be exposed, from a
spirit of opposition t o the measures they migil.t have
t�ought it their duty t o adopt and sustain by common consent ,
according to the principles of justice and equity ; and having
not less at heart the c ompletion of the dispositions of the
Treaty of Pari s , in a manner that may b e most comfo rmable to its
true aim and spirit , have for these ends resolved t o make a
so lemn convention and defensive alliance together .•
Wherefore, his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, has nominated, as hio pleni
potentiary in this mutter, the most honourable Robert
Stewart , Vis count Castlereagh • • • •
His Majesty the King of France and Navarre , M . Charles
Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince de Talleyrand . . .. .
And His T/Iajesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and
Bohemia, Herr Clement-Wenceslas-Lothaire , Prinee of
Metternich-Winneburg Ochsenhausen • • • • • • •
Who , after having exchanged their powerti , Vlhich were
found to be duly drawn up, agreed to the following article s :
F'IHST ART IC LE . -- The high contracting Powers mutually
aere e , individually and collectively , to act in concert ,
with the moot perfect d i s interentedncss and complete Good
faith, in order ·to put into execution the arrangement::> of
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the traaty of Paris nece�sar:{ t o complete its disp o � i tions,
and t o see that they be carried out in a manner that shall
be most conformable to the true spirit o f the treaty .
I f, consequent upon this, and from avernion to proposals
that may have been made and sustained by common agreement ,
the possessions of any of them were attacked, at such time
and in such c ircumstance s , they promise and bind themselves
t o consider them all three as attn.eked, to make common cause
with the one attacked, and t o assist each other in repelling
Dny such aggressi on with all the forces hereafter specified.
ART . II � - If for the reo.sons above mentioned, \·vhieh can
only give rise to the present allianc e , one of the high con
tracting powers were to be threatened by· one or seve ral powers ,
the tv�o other signat ories shall be bound t o do their utmo s t ,
by means of a friendly intervention, t o prevent ho s-+; i l i t i e s .
ART . I I I .
I n case their efforts t o attain that aim
failed, the high contracting powers promise to come .i.mmediately
to the help of' the pov1er att acked , each of them wi th an anny
of one hundred and fifty thousand men.
AHT IV . :_ E ach aforesaid army will be composed re
spect ively of one hundred and twenty thousand men of infa.1try ,
e.nd thirty thousn.nd men of cavalry , with a train of artillery
and ammunition proportionate to the number of troop s .
In order to contribute more efficiently t o the defence
of the power attacked or threatene d , the auxiliary tro op s
aforesaid will have to b e ready to take the field within a
delay of' six weeks at the lat e s t , after being calied upon to
-

do n o .

ART . V � ---The situation o f the countries which might
biacome the Seat of v;ar, or other circumstances being likely
to prevent England from providing, within the appointed delay,
the stipulated c ont ingent of Engl ish troops, and keep ing it on
a war-footing, His Britanni c J..ia j e sty reserves to himself the
righ t of providing foreign levies as his share of troops to
the power requiring his help, the said fore ign levies t o be
in the puy of England, or t o pay annually t o the power in
question a sum of' money calculated at the rate of 20 pounds
for each infantry soldier, and of' 3 0 pou.nds for a horseman,
until the st ipulated help have been completed.
The way in which Great Britain will he�ve t o provide her
help will be arranged privately between His Britannic majesty
anc1 t he power threatened , as soon as
tJ�e latter shall have
c lnimed the said r.elp.
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ART . V I . -The high contracting powers agre e , in case
v1ar should break out , t o arrange privately the mode of co
operation best uuited to the nature as well ao to the object
of the war, and to settle in like manne r the plans of campaign,
all matters relative to com.'na.11d , respecting which eve-ry facility
sh�t.1.1 be o.f'forded , the lines of operation of the troops res
pectively employed, the marches of those troops and their
provisions in food and forage .
ART . VII . -I f i t should be found that the help
stipulated be not proportionate to the requirenents of
circumstance s , the high contracting powero reserve to them8elves the right of making together, within the sho rt e s t
possible delay , a fresh arrangement fixing the additional
help which may be deemed necesGary .
ART . VIII . - The high contracting powero mutually agree
that in case those who shall have provided the help stipulated
above , should, for that reason, be involved in direct war 'Ni th
the power t.gainst which their help shall have been proYide d ,
the power that shall have claimed help and the powers from
whom such help shall have been claimed , vmging war as auxiliarie s ,
shall make peace only by mutual consent .
ART . IX. ---The st ipulations agreed upon in the present
treaty shall not alter or modify in any way a:ny provision which
tho high contracting powers, or any of them, may have previously
agreed upon or may subsequently consent to with other powers,
inasmuch that those provisions are not or shall not be contrary
to the object of the present alliLl.llc e .
ART . X . - The high contractiilb powers , having no intention
of age;randizing themselve s , and being solely animated by the
desire of mutually protecting themselve� in the exercise of their
rights and in the fulfilling of their duties as independent
stat e s , agree , in case, which God forbid, war were to break
out , to consider the Treaty o f Pario as the legal bas i n on which,
at the time of signing the peace, the nature , extent , and
front ier3 of their respective doniniono should be settled.
ART . XI . � They moreover agree to settle all other
�att e rs by mutual consent , whilst adherine ,
us far a3 cir
cu_�cta.� ces will permi t , to the principlen and provisions of
the aforesaid Treaty of Pari s .
ART . XII . --- The con�ractint; powern renerve to themselves ,
by the present compact , the right o f inviting all other powers
to accede to this treaty in such delayn fl.nd under such conditions
aG 3hnll have been agreed between them.
ART . XIII. --- Hi3 Majesty the King of the United Kingdom

1C 3
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of Great Britain and I reland, having on the Continent no
posse ::.> s i on which could be attacked in case of war alluded t o
i n the prcoGnt treaty , the high contracting powers agre e
that if such war should brevJc out , and the p osses s ions of His
I,Iajesty the King of Hanover or those of His HighnecG the
3overeiei1 ?:--i nc e of the Uni ted Province s of the Nethe rland � ,
as well as tho c e subr!li ttea. t o his rule , were attacked,
the
naid contract ing povm rs shull be obliged to act , in ord er t o
repulse that riggrescion, Em though the latt€r were directed
against their ovm territory.
ART . XIV . --- The present convent ion shall be rat ified ,
and its rat ifi cat ions exchunged at Vienna, within :::; ix weeki::: ,
or s o oner if pos s ible .
In �itness whereof, the respective plenipo tentiari es
sit,-ned it and appended thereto the seal s of their arms .
Done at Vienna, on the thi rd day of January , in the
year of our Lorrl one thousn.nd 0 ight hundre d and fifteen.
CASTLEREAGH .
THE PRINCE VON I1IET'l1ERHICH.
THE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.
SEPARATE AND SEc:rnT ARTICLE.
The high c ontract ing power:.:J r:;pe c i ally c.gre e , in the
present £1.rticle , �o call upon the Ki� of Bavaria, the King of
Eanover, and the Sovere ign Prince o f the United Provinc e s of the
Natherlands , t o assent to the treaty of to -d ay ' s dat e , tmder
rc aG onable conditions concerning the nU!nber of troopc they
may b e called upon to furnish as their share ; in their turn,
the high contrac t ing powers bind themselves t o enforce tne
full effect of the re 8p e ct ive provioions of the treatieG
concer.aing Bavari a , Hanover, cmd Holland.
It i s , however, unde rG t oo d that in case one of the above
raentioned powers shoulC. decline t o assent to the precent treaty,
after having been called upon to do :.:> o , an suid above , t!'!is
power chall b e coniJidered as having forfei t e 6.. its rig�1ts t o
the advantages t o which i t might have been entitled, i n accord
ance with the G t ipulat i onc of to-duy ' n convent ion.
The pres ent sep arate and secret art icle shall be as valid
and bind ing ao though i t were in3erted. nord for worcl in to-day ' s
conventi on ; it will be ratified ru1d its ratification will be
exchanged ut the sarne time .
In witneez whereof the plenipotentiaries nigned it and
appe:_cled thereunto the se al of their arms . Done at Vienna, the
third clay o f January in the year of onr Lord one thouEand eight
h1mdred und fifteen.
( The signatures here follow. )
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